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Abstract 
 
This report aims to determine recommendations for best practices in managing alarm floods in 
real time under all operating conditions, by identifying the underlying attributes and purpose of 
an alarm, including human factors impacting the alarm management system. Alarm floods are 
introduced in the context of process control systems. Three standards and two companies were 
investigated to assess control systems technology, alarm philosophy, alarm flood management 
techniques and alarm flood control.   
 
Analysis methods have been developed using standard software to compare company alarm 
performance against industry standards EEMUA Publication 191, ISA 18.2 and IEC-62682. 
The investigations and alarm data analysed identified improvement areas in the alarm standards 
lifecycle stage ‘monitoring and assessment’. Analysis proved high frequency alarms corrupt 
data and performance measurements therefore require timely identification, repair, replacement 
and or removal. Alarm priority distribution analysis identified a tendency for alarms to be 
assigned high priority, averaging 5 to 6 times the standard percentage limit. Causing stress on 
operator’s to respond faster than a low priority alarm require. Analysing unspecified 
performance areas for time periods between alarm annunciation, acknowledgment and returning 
to normal, identified a potential 30% reduction in alarm rates through targeted suppression, 
certain alarms for tuning, repair or review and contributes to the assessment of alarm 
manageability and operator work rate. 
 
Continuously assessing all alarm performance areas specified in the standards will identify 
areas necessary to improve alarm performance, inversely increase profits and reduce exposing 
companies and public to undue hazards and risk.   
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1.0 Introduction 
 
This dissertation explores alarm management for process control systems in the oil and gas 
hydrocarbon processing sector. The investigation sought to understand and determine the causes 
of industrial process control alarm floods and recommend approaches to help prevent or 
manage high alarm rate events in consideration with other industry standards and practices with 
the hope new improvements opportunities and practices may be identified.  
 
Alarm management has two aspects one being hardware (process control design engineered 
alarm management) solution and the other a human optimisation solution through integration 
with technologies hardware. 
 
Studying alarm management is often due to personal experience with poorly performing alarm 
systems. Alarms are audible and/or visible means of indicating to the operator an equipment 
malfunction, process deviation, or abnormal condition requiring a response. Unfortunately, 
responses are often hindered during high alarm rates because operators become stressed during 
the abnormality however prolonged the alarm period and whatever aged technology is 
employed.  
 
Technology continues to evolve at its rapid rate, cheaper new, complex microprocessor-based 
self-diagnosing products enter the market daily, often making it more economical to implement 
newer fast and intelligent sensors and control systems as opposed to maintaining the old. The 
new technology introduces countless programmable alarms via selectable options which help 
operators, engineers, vendors and maintenance personnel understand equipment health and 
behaviour through monitoring and reporting. The desire to design and build most intuitive 
control systems with a titanic alarm system that monitors an infinite number of variables can 
and has inadvertently designed into the control system a potentially hazardous condition of 
alarm overloads. The consequences of alarm overloads often exacerbate the abnormal situation 
by overwhelming the operator into abandoning the alarm system or downplaying the alarms 
which can be part of a safety instrumented function (SIF) further eroding another layer of 
protection. 
 
Unfortunately, poor alarms systems and their effects are well documented. Governing 
authorities across the world that investigate industrial incidents report poor performing alarm 
systems contribute as a cause or the escalation of major industrial accidents in most cases. In 
12 
 
response, governing authorities and organisations have collaborated to develop standards and 
guidance practices to best implement and manage alarm system performance against these 
benchmark standards.  
 
This dissertation studies the relevant standards, company procedures, policies, technical papers 
and alarm data in the pursuit of gauging, improving or finding a benchmark for alarm 
management in the oil and gas or industry at large.  
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2.0 Alarm Overview 
 
2.1 Brief overview from the beginning 
 
Over the past 60 years the number, type and frequency of alarms in control systems has 
increased rapidly with electronic microprocessor based technology.  
 
Historically, process control was manual or semi-automatic (Figure 1) and the demand for 
labour was high due to the manual operation of localised plant spread across a large 
geographical area comprising of the processing plants installation. Personnel (operators) 
attended to the processes by reading analogue gauges and adjusting the pneumatic controls to 
maintain steady production at desired values via this semi-automated instrumentation process 
control system. Discrete alarm signals were routed to the various control room(s) via micro-
switches and relays, alerting the operator to abnormal conditions via an audible and visual 
means typically a (lamp based) annunciator matrix panel and siren. As technology evolved, 
alarm printers were introduced in the form of dot matrix ribbon printer, used to record alarms 
and events as they occurred in sequence. Unfortunately, the printer was considered distracting 
in operation, bulky, consumed large amounts of paper and required expensive replaceable ink 
ribbons. It is said the printed alarm records were not very useful and operators would save 
disposal time by feeding the printed alarm record directly into a shredder (Liptak, 2006). 
However, in spite of these technological challenges, the additional operators shared the 
workload and stress by assigning functional duties to areas of plant. 
 
During the early days, installing new process alarms often amounted to significant costs partly 
due to the size of the device, apparatus or equipment, the labour to install, operate and maintain 
as well as carrying an inventory of spare parts to help support the maintenance of the 
installation or system over its lifecycle.  
 
Figure 1: Manual operator control system. (Bela G. Liptak, 2006, Vol.2, p.107, fig.2.1y) 
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Although hard-wire systems initially installed to monitor alarm states, computer-based control 
systems developed and wire systems soon became the accepted and preferred method for 
control replacing pneumatic signal tubing which was limited by function, speed and distance. 
Physically smaller and able to span greater distances, hard-wire signals condensed an 
installations footprint transmitting a greater number of signals in real time as opposed 
pneumatic signals. Soon a centralised control room emerged in preference to various process 
area control rooms scattered across the processing plant.  
 
Given the emergence of the centralised control room, technology improvement and integration 
into the process control loop reduced the demand for labour. Electronic control hardware 
(electronics are static have limited movement hence no wear and tear) improved reliability 
reducing maintenance and the centralised control room condensed multiple areas and operators 
to a few, as illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2 : Pneumatic / Electric central control room. (Bela G. Liptak, 2006, Vol.2, p.196, fig.2.11h) 
 
The introduction of the basic, less expensive and compact personal computer (PC) in the 
1990’s, replaced the noisy alarm dot matrix printers in the control room. PC’s also provided a 
means of storing and analysing alarm data in a user friendly environment as opposed to the 
paper based system, at this point alarm analysis and performance measuring was born. 
   
As industry strived to develop new technology, new features and applications, the modern 
digitalised plant arrived and business overheads continued to be reduced. Compared to the 
pneumatic plants of yesterday, fewer personnel were out in the field resulting in less injuries 
and labour costs, plant complexity and performance increased through automation, continuous 
monitoring and adjustment which led to greater output of product. In addition, apparatus costs 
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continue to decrease with the increase in products available adding to greater profits and returns 
for shareholders.  
 
For different reasons manufacturers tried to limit third party system connections in preference 
for their own proprietary control systems however, in the early 2000’s more mainstream 
products became available. Distributed Control Systems (DCS) soon adapted to employ third 
party platforms with products like Microsoft based operating systems now commonplace. These 
third party products utilised a system of object linking and embedding (OLE) for process 
control (www.opcfoundation.org) that led to an industry consortium specifying open 
connectivity PC solutions for industrial control. With the advent of OLE consortium, open 
platform communication (OPC) was soon linking third party systems with the controllers, 
transferring alarm, events and other data in a standard format from the controller to external 
PC’s and third party products. With OPC read / write functions, alarms and configuration files 
are accessed readily between control system and third party hardware/software.  
 
Figure 2 and 3 illustrate the reduction in interconnecting hardware between equipment by way 
of data highway cables replacing multiple analogue wire signals, also included was a reduction 
in personnel for the same process infrastructure on account of automation. Not captured in the 
illustration is the new wireless technology, which replaces interconnecting cables between field 
device and the controller. 
 
Figure 3: Modern process plant with control system (Bela G. Liptak, 2006, Vol.2, p.196, fig.2.11g) 
 
The control and alarm system evolution would not be where it is today had it not been for 
dedicated people within industry forming steering committees or technical bodies who 
consistently engaged, facilitated and guided industry as a whole on matters involving alarm 
management. This ensured those responsible designing, commissioning, maintaining and using 
alarm management systems were provided relevant publications and standards to align.  
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To provide an overview of the timeline – 
 
1955 – International Society of Automation (ISA) formed a committee for titled 
instrument alarms and interlocks that later evolved into Standards and Practices 
committee 18. 
 
1965 – The ISA committee 18 published the ISA-RP 18.1, ‘Specifications and Guides 
for the use of general purpose annunciators. Lamp based annunciators are a panel 
mounted matrix of lights with transparent coloured text labels printed to outline the 
alarm condition or state. 
 
 
Figure 4: Example of a panel mounted annunciator (Engineered Solutions, 2012) 
 
1979 – (R2004) Annunciators Sequencers and Specifications  
 
1994 – A consortium of private enterprise industry representatives and U.S. National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) formed the ‘abnormal situation 
management (ASM) consortium focused on better response to industry incidents. 
 
1999 – Engineering Equipment and Materials Users’ Association (EEMUA) issued its 
first publication 191 Alarm Systems: A guide to design management and procurement 
was released 
 
2003 – User Association of process control technology in chemical and 
pharmaceuticals industries (NAMUR) issued recommendation NA102 – Alarm 
management. 
 
17 
 
2007 – EEMUA publication 191  
 
2009 - ISA-RP 18.2, – Management of alarm systems for the process industries 
 
2014 – IEC 62682 - Management of alarms systems for the process industries was 
accepted by vote as the international standard. Derived from American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI)/ International Society of Automation (ISA) Standard 18.2 - 
Management of Alarm Systems in the Process Industries  
 
2015 – ISA-RP 18.2 – Management of alarm systems for the process industries  
 
Today these standards committees still convene to share knowledge and produce publications 
for industry and also underpin this report.  
 
Today’s modern control system resembles more of a computer than controller. Illustrated in 
figure 5 is Honeywell’s Experion process control system architecture. The lower line 
supervisory control network allows controllers to interacting with the field devices and each 
other, rising up to the advanced control network and business network of computers, all talking 
and supporting the controllers below. This illustration summarises an integrated control safety 
system (ICSS) from process sensors, old legacy technology integration via a local control 
network, supervisory control, advanced networks servicing remote stations, CCTV or operator 
simulation and up to a business network catering for web browsing and maintenance package 
integration. 
 
Likening the modern control system to a computer portrays how alarms can be created or 
changed within a programming environment which has resulted in alarms being configured at 
low cost and a greater numbers introducing the ability to monitor anything and everything, 
resulting in an increase in safety and operability through programmable diagnosis. 
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Figure 5: Honeywell Experion process control system network (Sheehan, 2008)   
 
Furthermore, microprocessor technology is also embedded in the transmitters and sensors. 
Single modular auto-ranging remote transducers (SMART) facilitate functional online changes 
via their microprocessor base, allowing communication over networks such as data highways, 
Modbus, HART, Foundation fieldbus and more. Integrating the transducer into the control 
system allows the transducer / transmitters to provide self-diagnostic abilities, alarms (sensor 
failure), performance data or degradation, calibration, history, loss of signal, maintenance and 
other data on request. Another type is the highway addressable remote transducer (HART) 
standard helps instruments to digitally communicate with one another over the same two wires 
used to convey a 4-20 milli-ampere analogue instrument signal (Liptak, 2006). 
 
In conclusion, automation has enabled industry to remove people from harm and ensures 
optimum performance by continually monitoring and adjusting. The introduction of computer 
based technology provides personnel with the ability to obtain every bit of information no 
matter how trivial to use or present this information in ways to remain in control of the process 
and the equipment controlling the process. Where human intervention is required the 
information exchange occurs via the human machine interface (HMI) or operator console (see 
figure 5), alarms are configured to alert the operator of an abnormal condition requiring a 
response to correct the condition. It is the exchange and human interaction or involvement in 
the control function that requires closer scrutiny.        
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2.2 Alarming Hazard 
 
Poor alarm management systems expose companies, governments and the public to unnecessary 
hazards, environmental damage, loss of reputation, financial cost, injury and potentially loss of 
life. The US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) a leading authority in incident investigations cite 
alarm floods as a significant contributing cause to industrial incidents (Beebr et al, 2012). 
Supporting CSB’s claim, the British-based organisation Engineering Equipment & Materials 
Users’ Association (EEMUA) reported similar root causes contributed to major incidents 
around the world, including Three Mile Island, Bhopal and Texaco Milford Haven as 
documented in their alarms systems publication 191 first released in 1999 (EEMUA, 2013). 
 
The Milford Haven refinery explosion resulting in a major fire on the 24th July 1994 injured 
twenty-six people (HSE Books, 1997). The plant was struck by lightning, which caused the 
process control instruments to fail or become unreliable for over five hours. It is estimated the 
rate of alarms was in excess of 1 alarm every 2-3 seconds Consequently, the operators were 
overwhelmed by alarms and failed to identify a build-up of liquid in a knock-out vessel that 
eventually overflowed, leading to the explosion and fire (EEMUA, 2013). This abnormal 
situation demonstrates the hazards alarms floods present to process operations by effectively 
rending the operator and alarm system helpless during high rates of alarms. The investigating 
authority Health Safety Executive (HSE) of the United Kingdom (UK) prosecuted company’s 
Texaco Ltd and Gulf Oil (Great Britain) Ltd. Each company pleaded guilty to the charges under 
the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, sections 2 and 3, at Swansea Crown Court on 22 
November 1996, the costs included £200 000 in legal fees, £143,700 in fines and £48 million in 
plant damage (HSE Books, 1997). 
 
The United States of America, West Virginia 28th August 2008, the Bayer Cropscience 
pesticide process plant experienced a chemical reaction runaway causing a pressure vessel to 
explode killing two and injuring eight people (CSB, 2011).  
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Figure 6: Bayer vessel explosion (CSB, 2011, p.0) 
 
The first indication of the incident was a high pressure alarm. Investigating the controller trends 
revealed the residue treater pressure was above the maximum operating pressure and climbing 
rapidly as illustrated in Figure 7. Suspecting a blockage, the control room operator contacted 
two outside operators to check the vent system. Without advice, the control room operator 
manually reversed the residue treater recirculation system to full cooling mode in an attempt to 
slow or stop the climbing pressure (CSB, 2011). A few minutes after sending the outside 
operators to investigate, a violent explosion erupted. Operators scrambled to shut down the 
system.  
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Figure 7: Trends leading into the Bayer vessel explosion (CSB, 2011, p.39)  
 
The CSB investigators highlighted a number of contributing factors. The old control system 
problems were transferred to the newly upgraded control system. Due to the hazardous process 
and risk to people, public and environment, a separate safety instrumented system (SIS) to the 
basic control system was required. A SIS would have averted this disaster through a controlled 
shutdown (CSB, 2011). Another contributing causal factor was operators could make 
unauthorised program changes and or alter alarm settings outside if management of change 
processes which would have involved closer scrutiny by engineering staff. 
 
Unfortunately, the West Virginian pesticide plant was no stranger to large scale incidents (CSB, 
2011). Fifteen years earlier on the 18th August 1993, under different ownership, a similar 
incident occurred resulting in a fatality and two people injured. The explosion occurred in the 
chloracetaldoxime (CAO) reactor loop of the methomyl unit. Investigators believe a flow 
indicator malfunction led to over-chlorination of acetaldoxime, causing a violent decomposition 
in the chemicals which resulted in an explosion which ruptured pipes, releasing flammable 
liquid that fuelled and sustained a large fire.  The investigation also reported the workers 
activities were not causally related to the incidents. However, the investigation team 
recommended the company identify and treat all emergency shutdown interlock alarms as 
critical. A Further recommendation were to apply the plant alarm management procedure with 
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regard to nuisance alarms, review and revise procedures for disabling alarms and by-passing 
interlocks a practice used during a process unit start-up to bypass safeguards. Basically a carbon 
copy the recommended improvements required from both incidents, the difference being had 
the first recommendations been applied in 1993, the August 2008 incident could have been 
prevented. 
 
Another incident in the US involved a company named DuPont. Regarded as an industry leader 
of workplace health and safety practices DuPont’s sound reputation and widely used safe 
practice guidance system interested CSB when examining reasons that led to a decline in 
adherence to DuPont’s higher standard of performance. Being a chemical company, where 
incident severity has greater consequence potential, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board (CSB) examined three serious incidents that occurred at the Belle chemical 
manufacturing facility over a 33-hour period starting on January 22, 2010. The trio of incidents 
began with an alarm, leading operators to discover an estimated 2,000 pounds of methyl 
chloride, a flammable gas or refrigerant, had been leaking for 5 days unnoticed.  
 
The CSB findings identified deficiencies in DuPont’s operational management systems which 
included the lack of -    
 
 Maintenance and inspections  
 Alarm recognition and management  
 Incident investigation  
 Emergency response and communications  
 Hazard recognition 
 
In the United Kingdom (UK), the Health Safety Executive (HSE) (an equivalent authority to 
America’s CSB), commissioned a research project conducted by Bransby Automation Ltd to 
determine best practice on the procurement, design and management of alarm systems. Of the 
sites visited, the research team quantified several million pounds in losses across 15 industrial 
sites, attributable to missed alarm incidents (Bransby et al, 1997). However the report suggests 
the untold stories and costs not mentioned during the research interviews would compound this 
value.  
 
To quantify the benefits of an effective alarm system the following incidents provide an 
overview of alarms implicated in industrial incidents in the UK. 
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2.2.1 Plant damage 
 
 A compressor tripped in a large petrochemical plant causing two days production loss 
before resuming production estimated cost around £1M. This event caused other 
components damage, requiring another unscheduled plant outage months later to repair the 
damage and undertake repairs to other equipment at a cost of £12M. The investigation 
revealed six weeks prior to the compressor trip a high axial displacement alarm occurred 
which the operators accepted but did not report or investigate. Three days prior to the trip 
there was a second axial alarm also not reported or investigated. This example demonstrates 
the need to ensure adequate prioritisation, attention and or reporting occurs to ensure the 
right people are made aware even if the alarm is considered trivial (Bransby et al, 1997). 
 
 A newly trained power plant operator experiences repeated high thrust bearing temperature 
alarms on a feed pump over a period of minutes. Rather than reference the alarm 
instructions available in the Distributed Control System (DCS) he decided to send the field 
operator to investigate the pump. Twenty minutes later the field operator reports back and 
shuts down the pump. Unfortunately this delay caused £250,000 in pump damage, had the 
operator used the DCS instructions advising to stop the pump on alarm activation, the pump 
may only have sustained repairable damage at less cost (Bransby et al, 1997). 
 
 
2.2.2 Lost production 
 An operator concentrating on a disturbance on one part of a large petrochemical plant 
misses an alarm in another part of the plant resulting in a trip plant and consequently a plant 
shutdown. This is the only plant trip in the last two years that would have been preventable 
with a better alarm system. The typical cost of such a trip was estimated at £250,000 
(Bransby et al, 1997). 
 
2.2.3 Environmental incidents 
 A vessel containing hazardous chemicals was overfilled 3 times in the past 10 years due to 
operators failing to respond to alarms and the high level protection did not operate. The 
incidents had resulted in a breach of environmental constraints and reported injury to people 
(Bransby et al, 1997). 
 
 Another environmental incident involves exceeding environmental statutory limits from an 
uncontrolled chemical discharge into the sea. The cause was a chemical tank level 
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controller left in manual, the tank level increased to overflow allowing product to enter the 
drain. A drain analyser with a sample rate of ten minutes intervals delayed the analyser’s 
alarm before the operators were alerted to take corrective action. The investigation found 
that the operator first missed the tank high level alarm among other associated alarms due to 
experiencing an alarm flood (100 alarms per hour) (Bransby et al, 1997). 
 
 
2.2.4 Commissioning  
 A newly commissioned process plant was tripping frequently. Analysis of the high level 
spurious alarms proved the trips were due to poor operability of the plant. During low alarm 
floods the alarm rates were in excess of 30 alarms per hour however post plant-trip there 
would typically be 3 to 4000 alarms in the first 10 minutes. An estimated £500,000 project 
to improve the operability of the plant would save £1M per year in reduction of unplanned 
trips (Bransby et al, 1997). 
 
 During commissioning a power station’s 125V DC control supply failed. The operator did 
not notice the 125V DC alarm on account of experiencing a high rate of spurious alarms, 72 
hours passed before the fault was discovered. During this period the electrical protection 
systems was inoperable, the danger being had an electrical fault occurred during this period 
would have caused major plant damage, injury to personnel, and significant delay to the 
commissioning programme (Bransby et al, 1997). 
 
2.2.5 Australia  
 Australia’s oil and gas industry has also experienced catastrophic failures, one involving a 
high pressure gas compressor on board a Floating Production and Storage Offtake (FPSO) 
facility in 2010. Maersk Ngujima-yin FPSO was operating in the Vincent Field off the coast 
of North West Australia, Ningaloo National Park. Originally built as a large crude cargo 
vessel in 2000 until September 2007 when the vessel was transformed into an FPSO in 
Singapore. In June-July 2008, the Ngujima-yin was commissioned and commenced oil 
production. At approximately 12:50pm on the 13th of April 2009 an explosion and 
subsequent fire occurred. The incident resulted in a hydrocarbon release (natural gas 
flammable gas cloud) that subsequently ignited (ignition source most likely a hot surface in 
the compressor enclosure) producing a jet fire (concentrated fire caused by high pressurised 
gas escaping from a containment system i.e. vessel, piping or compressor) at the 
compressor area and secondary fire in the enclosure. Fortunately, no fatalities or injuries 
recorded.  
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The National Offshore Petroleum Safety Environment Management Authority 
(NOPSEMA) identified the control room operator was overwhelmed by ‘nuisance alarms’ 
causing the operator to overlook significant alarms (NOPSEMA, 2010). An excerpt from 
NOPSEMA’s prohibition notice number 0197 dated 20th April 2009: 
 
 
“The ABB Central Control Room (CCR) Alarms Management System record of initiated 
alarms during the period 1st March 2009 to 16th April 2009 details daily alarm counts 
from 192 up to 3605 per day with the majority in excess of 300 per day. The Control Room 
display screen available to the Operator only provides three lines of alarm detail. The 
control room operator’s console is exposed to constant distraction with other activities 
ongoing at other work stations.” (DMA, 2009) 
 
A key lesson communicated by NOPSEMA in an industry communication, incident report 
alert 39, states companies are to ensure control room operators are not overloaded by 
‘nuisance alarms’ and advised this will be achieved through an effective alarm management 
strategy where repetitive alarms are minimised through what is known as an alarm 
rationalisation process. Also advising the removal or dependence on operators to safeguard 
facility compressors by an effective fail safe control system, fortunately no casualties 
resulted from this major incident (NOPSEMA, 2010).  
 
In addition to NOPSEMA’s investigation, an independent investigation into the same event 
by the Division for Investigation of Maritime Accidents, through the Danish Maritime 
Authority, 16th November 2009 Case – 200905173. This report outlined similar findings in 
relation to alarm management. Surprisingly, the facility employed modern day technology 
and engineering practices which should have ensured this type of situation would not have 
occurred ((DMA, 2009). 
  
As these incidents demonstrate, there is much evidence to justify investing capital and resources 
to continuously improve the performance of an organisations alarm management and process 
control alarm system. This should help ensure plant process safety strategies are executed 
during abnormal situations, improve commercial asset security through prompt diagnosis and 
response by staff, reduce overhead costs caused by facility downtime and minimise potential 
liabilities through an effective alarm system. Lastly, the alarm system is an auditing tool used 
by authorities when investigating incidents hence, a poorly performing alarm system implicated 
in an incident will cloud perceptions of a company’s ability to operate safely. 
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2.3 Alarms 
 
Modern industrial process control systems play an essential role in providing the operator an 
overview and also access to a multitude of process variables via cleverly designed human 
machine interfaces (HMI). These HMIs help attract the operators attention to abnormal 
situations by audio and visual signals or warnings in the form of an alarm. 
 
The purpose of an alarm is to direct the operator’s attention towards a plant condition requiring 
timely assessment and action (EEMUA, 2013). The alarm system should alert, inform, confirm 
and guide the operator with relevant alarms and useful information. Alarm annunciation should 
allow enough time to for the operator to respond and prevent unnecessary shutdowns and limit 
process upsets (off specification product) which undermine profits. Alarms need to be 
purposeful and prioritised, highlighting critical conditions and provide detailed information for 
necessary response action to return the process variable back to the targeted set point value or 
operating envelope.  It is important to note the operator is human; therefore consideration must 
include a rational expectation of one’s ability to manage numerous abnormal situations in a 
short period of time.    
 
The term alarm systems relates to the system(s) as a whole including an alarm philosophy, 
alarm management, generation, logic, processing, alarm presentation and monitoring. A control 
system may be integrated (see figure 8) with many dedicated control systems integrated as one  
i.e. safety instrumented system (SIS) or emergency shutdown system (ESD), distributed control 
system (DCS) or basic process control system (BPCS) and Fire and Gas (F&G) system. Each 
controller communicates via dedicated networks to deliver alarms to the operator via HMI.   
 
For this reason, different types of alarms and alarm systems may be implemented and titled by 
defining naming conventions according to their functional relationship. The overviews of the 
listed terms below are in reference to EEMUA 191.  
 
 Process alarms – Primarily derive from the DCS or BPCS by sharing the same sensor. A 
process alarm’s functional relationship generally assists by optimising efficiency by 
monitoring targeted envelopes of a process. 
 
 System status and Equipment alarms - Identify and alert problems with equipment i.e. 
communication network fault, remote controller failure, battery backup failure. These types 
of alarms target maintenance or engineering personnel however, they are often brought to 
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the operator attention first given their severity should, for example, a controller 
communication network fail. 
 
 Safety related alarms - High in priority, safety alarms advise potentially dangerous or 
damaging condition in the plant. These alarms protect the control system and are often 
independent of the process sensors and alarms. These alarms serve as a pre-alarm to 
pending executive action taken by the SIS if the condition continues to escalate. In many 
cases this type of alarm is generated by the SIS also known as the safety shutdown system. 
This approach is good in some ways providing independence from the main control system. 
However, the disadvantage can include double up of alarms (shutdown or safety related) or 
the risk of common cause failure between the SIS and the pre-alarm system and must be 
considered in the reliability analysis of the overall protection system. 
 
 Shutdown alarms - Advises the operator of an automatic shutdown has been initiated by 
the SIS to return the plant or process back to a safe state. Shutdown alarms and events are 
important information as well as knowing the sequence of events and timelines. This often 
help operators diagnose shutdown cause and to target responses. In some cases, only the 
first shutdown alarm annunciates the subsequent shutdown alarms are a result of the process 
returning to a safe state and are suppressed to prevent an alarm flood. 
 
Note Figure 8 shows a single sensor and final control element connected to various controllers 
including SIS and BPCS via the input/output (I/O) modules. Normally, these controllers well 
have separate sensors and final control elements to ensure system integrity based on control 
function and criticality i.e. the SIS will have a standalone sensor and final control element.    
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Figure 8: Alarm system data flow through hardware (ISA 18.2, 2009, p12) 
 
Alarms are typically configured around an operational state i.e. when a pump is required to 
operate (run) any change in its run state i.e. pumped overloaded and tripped, should trigger an 
alarm for the operator to investigate and correct the reason causing the pump to trip.  
 
Alarms and their messages may require a simple correction or acknowledgement of a change in 
condition. However; an alarm may also be generated from a serious safety hazard emerging. 
Therefore the allocation of the type of alarm associated with equipment or condition varies in 
design, it is critical an alarm is functional by type and prioritised, otherwise the performance of 
the alarm system, process, safety and operator reaction will be undermined.  
   
Alarms and alarm floods typically result from a change. Change is the transition between 
considered states as shown in Figure 9. The events surrounding a change could include 
plant/equipment changing from run to shut-down, run to upset state or a change in state (on – 
off / tripped). Given there is a vast array of alarms that can be configured in a control system for 
a single piece of equipment and condition, potentially hundreds or thousands of alarms could 
occur simultaneously in a process upset. It is not uncommon for today’s controllers to 
annunciate numerous alarms in a short period of time with a minor change in conditions. Often 
the first couple of alarms annunciate the initiating event, after which the following alarms can 
be unnecessary or redundant.   
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Unnecessary alarms distract the operator’s focus, especially when generated from a similar 
cause and do not aid the operator to manage the situation. Distractions amount to the operator 
workload having to decipher the alarm (or many in an alarm flood), differentiate between 
alarms using any instructions or process information available before acknowledging and 
responding. This additional diagnostic time on account of unnecessary alarms can compromise 
an operator’s response. If an alarm forms part safety instrumented function (SIF) a layer of 
protection by design will be compromised for a period. In any case, effective alarms ensure the 
process remains within its normal operating envelope. 
 
 
Figure 9: Targeted areas of operation (ISA18.2, 2009, p28) 
 
Another side-effect of being able to readily generate software alarms has also blindsided 
engineering controls (management of change) when creating alarms. It would appear on 
account of the low costs to implement an alarm, the juggle between want, need and required can 
often become blurred often undermined by a perceived improvement in integrity of a singular 
monitored condition rather than considering collective alarm systems operation. Therefore it is 
prudent that any alarm change requires a complete review prior to implementation (ISA, 2009). 
 
Naturally, some alarms are not necessary or are configured incorrectly, leading to nuisance 
alarms. Nuisance alarms do not assist the operator, they only crow the event log and load the 
controller’s microprocessor. 
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Alarms are vital in assisting operators to determine abnormal conditions in a plant which 
require a response. Their intended purpose cannot be underestimated based on industry 
evidence, however the authority and control surrounding alarm implementation or removal 
appears relaxed or token.    
 
2.4 Alarm Management Governing Bodies and Standards 
 
Generally, the governing authorities for alarm management reside within each county, state and 
industry authority. In counties like Australia, industry has adopted global industry best practices 
and guidelines for alarm system management where process control systems are utilised. 
  
The key standards and or guidelines for alarms management in Australia include but are not 
limited to –  
 
 The Engineering Equipment and Materials Users' Association (EEMUA) Publication 
191 - Alarm systems - A guide to design, management and procurement. 
 International Society of Automation (ISA) Standard 18.2 - Management of Alarm 
Systems in the Process Industries 
 Abnormal Situation Management (ASM) Consortium Guidelines - producing various 
publications on process control system and alarm management. 
 IEC 62682 - Management of alarm systems for the process industries 
 
A governing body for offshore oil and gas sector in Australian is the National Offshore 
Petroleum Safety Environment Management Authority (NOPSEMA). NOPSEMA regulates 
industry through company based safety cases that document how the company will safely 
manage their business and operations without damage to people and the environment.  
 
Included in Australia are relevant acts of law that empower authorities i.e. Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Act 1967. Apart from the newly voted IEC 62682 – 2014 standard to which 
Australia aligns, there appears to be no Australian acts or regulations calling up (standard 
becomes enforceable by law) a specific standard for alarm management. Therefore, given 
industry’s adoption of the mentioned standards, research will be focused on these standards, 
publications and guidelines. 
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3.0 Literature Review  
 
3.1 Alarm Standards  
 
The three standards reviewed are ANSI/ISA18.2, IEC-62682 and EEMUA 191. ANSI/ISA18.2 
and IEC-62682 are very similar, mostly differing in language use. Hence IEC-62682 will be 
covered as part of ANSI/ISA18.2 in this review. In comparison, EEMUA 191 and 
ANSI/ISA18.2 are similar as cross-referenced below.  
 
EEMUA 191    ISA 18.2  
Chapters 1&2    Philosophy 
Chapters 2&3    Identification 
Chapters 2&3    Rationalization 
Chapters 4&5    Detailed Design 
Chapters 5&7    Implementation 
Chapter 6    Operation 
Chapter 6    Maintenance 
Chapter 3    Management of Change 
Chapter 6    Audit 
 
However similar, both EEMUA 191 and ANSI/ISA18.2 (ISA 18.2 from this point forward) are 
different in their own right and shall be reviewed separately for the purpose of identifying 
opportunities to better manage alarm systems. 
 
3.1.1 American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/ International Society of Automation 
(ISA) 18.2 - Management of alarms systems for the process industries 
 
ISA 18.2 summarises alarm management effectively through its lifecycle diagram (Figure 10) 
with stages summarised and cross-referenced to ISA 18.2 clauses (Table 1).  
 
The alarm lifecycle diagram identifies three rounded edge boxes A, H and J (Figure 10). These 
three stages are identified as initial entry points for managing an alarm system. The alarm 
philosophy stage (A) is covered in detail within the standard and only reviewed should stages 
(H) and (J) identify a need. Therefore monitoring and assessment stage (H) and auditing stage 
(J) are useful entry points to evaluate how effective an alarm management systems is designed, 
implemented and managed based on the philosophy and standard benchmarks. 
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Figure 10: Alarm management life cycle (ANSI/ISA 18.2, 2009, p 22) 
 
Monitoring performance is essential to control improvement, especially over time as sensors 
age and process conditions change. However, assessment of an alarm systems operational 
stages F, G and H in Figure 10 will also help gauge, predict or identify areas of improvement in 
maintenance / operator execution strategies. 
 
As to the audit stage (J) where the alarm management system may be reviewed holistically 
against revised standards or areas considered or identified requiring attention.    
33 
 
 
Table 1: Alarm Management Lifecycle Stage Inputs and Outputs (ANSI/ISA 18.2, 2009, p27) 
 
The various stages of an alarm’s lifecycle from activation to normal state are illustrated in detail 
by the alarm state transition diagram Figure 11. This transition diagram shows various paths an 
alarm may take depending on its configuration, equipment, criticality or process being 
monitored. Generally, well-designed control systems monitor and record each transition state to 
help determine the alarm systems performance. The transition stages G, H and I, are separate 
stages used for supressing (high frequency alarms requiring maintenance), alarms that are not 
required at the time (equipment shutdown or undergoing a plant trip event), alarms undergoing 
a management of change process or out of service. Utilising transition stages G, H and I allow 
the operator the ability to manage abnormal situations while ensuring the integrity of the alarms 
system does not overloaded the operator with unnecessary or nuisance alarms as identified. 
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Figure 11: Alarm State Transition Diagram (ANSI/ISA 18.2, 2009 p30) 
 
There are several factors that affect the transition states of an alarm (ISA 18.2, 2009): 
 
1. Measurement accuracy 
2. Control system processing speed 
3. HMI design and clarity 
4. Operator response delay (includes awareness, workload and training). 
5. Complexity of determining the corrective action 
6. Complexity of the corrective action. 
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7. Process dead time in response to the corrective action 
8. Process response time to the corrective action 
9. Dead band of the alarm set point 
 
These factors contribute towards what is referred to as a consequence threshold. Surpassing the 
consequence threshold causes an undesired chain of events which, depending on criticality, can 
result in a loss of production, environmental pollution, reduced asset service life and or unsafe 
plant condition. 
 
In terms of measurement accuracy, control system processing speed and process response dead 
time, these are considered maintenance / engineering areas of influence. However, the role of 
the operator in employing these systems to avert a consequence threshold requires 
consideration. 
 
Operator training for highly managed alarms is considered in ISA 18.2, outlining areas of 
training however, ISA 18.2 does not specify timeframes i.e. 2 yearly for refresher training. 
Operator refresher training in a simulated environment allows operators an opportunity to react 
and gauge their performance against high alarm rate scenarios. Disasters mentioned earlier 
highlight the importance and provide a model for such scenario training. 
 
Human performance shaping factors in section 5.6.4 of this report identify a variety of other 
variables that affects an operator’s ability to perform. These include workload, short term or 
working memory limitations, fatigue, training, and motivation. However means to measure 
human aspects is limited within the standard, hence given further consideration. 
 
Depending on the alarm criticality, alarm enhancement techniques outlined in the ISA18.2 
section 12.3 can be employed. The four alarm enhancements categories are -  
 
1. Information linking – by making information available to the operator i.e. procedures 
from within the HMI 
2. Logic based alarming – utilising logic to indicate or predict plant conditions 
3. Model based alarming – provides the operator with predictions based on simulated 
scenario results of the current process variable conditions predicted into the future 
4. Additional Alarm considerations – utilisation of auxiliary alarms systems. 
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These categories are just a few of the various alarming methods employed to ensure operators 
receive a manageable alarm rate particularly during process upsets where higher alarm rates are 
expected.  
 
The possibility of alarm analysis or design providing the wrong algorithm, effectively supresses 
or removes an alarm from the operator attention. These omissions should be identified during 
assessment audits. Audits should critically analyse undesirable events or poor alarm 
performance to determine whether alarms were mistakenly supressed or journaled in the event 
that had the suppressed alarm alerted the operator, the abnormal situation may have been 
averted.  
 
Some control systems have software capabilities to compare the rationalised master alarm 
database with the operating alarm system configuration in the controller. This auditing tool 
helps alert engineers to changes. The ISA 18.2 benchmark for unauthorised alarm changes is 
targeted for zero improperly changed alarms, meaning changes outside of the alarm philosophy 
and management of change procedure.  
 
ISA18.2 proposes completing audits periodically however leaves discretion to the companies 
alarm management philosophy and policy. The philosophy also outlines reporting of alarm 
system analysis to those identified responsible or concerned with the alarm management 
system. Suggesting a tailored approach to the needs of the recipient, the frequency and content 
contained in the report. 
 
The content of a report generally provides some performance criteria for comparison which is 
fundamental for improvement. It is expected the alarm systems performance will deteriorate 
over time as field equipment ages or process changes occur. Table 2 extracted from ISA 18.2 
provides a summary of the alarm performance metric. This benchmark metric suggests 
comparing 30 days of data against the metric however advises caution using averages as they 
can be misleading. This statement introduces the question of whether an average is acceptable 
to accurately gauge the performance of an alarm system and to what degree do these metrics 
help identify improvement opportunities within the alarm system. Furthermore ISA 18.2 
suggests alarm rates alone are not an indicator of acceptability.   
 
Table 2 provides the alarm rate averages categorised in per day, hour and 10 minute periods. 
These areas are divided into two columns for alarm rates i.e. likely to be acceptable and 
maximum manageable by the operator.  
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Table 2: Alarm performance metric summary (ISA 18.2, 2009, p76) 
 
Lastly the specification for alarm data is divided into two categories alarms records (time 
stamped raw data of all alarms and events) and alarm attributes (priority, set points, action, 
class, response, dead bands and types). These categories help arrange, filter and determine if the 
performance of the alarm system meets the design. 
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3.1.2 EEMUA Publication 191  
Alarm systems – A guide to design, management and procurement  
 
EEMUA publication 191 covers a large scope detailing the various aspects of alarm systems 
design, management and procurement. 
 
The amount of configurable alarms, their design and generation varies considerably. It is 
therefore vital any changes to an alarm must consider the complexity of the alarm for example.  
 
 Absolute alarms: compares the measured variable against a set point 
 Bit-pattern alarms: matches a predetermined pattern of digital signals. 
 Calculated alarms: based on various signal and conditions i.e. efficiency. 
 Control and instrumentation system alarms: self-diagnosed faults within the control 
and instrumentation system hardware or software. 
 Deviation alarms: Compares signals for variation 
 Discrepancy alarms: generated by comparing an expected plant state against an actual 
plant state. 
 Rate-of-change alarms: Occurs when a rate of change exceeds a predetermined setting 
i.e. speed or temperature. 
 Adaptive alarms: generated using the ‘rate-of-change’ or ‘deviation principle in 
combination with absolute thresholds. 
 Adjustable alarms: absolute alarms in which the alarm settings are adjusted to suit 
operating conditions. 
 Re-triggering alarms: alarms which are automatically re-annunciate to the operator in 
certain conditions.  
 Recipe-driven alarms: alarms that are turned on or off in different plant states. 
 Statistical alarms: utilising statistical calculations /process to filter out significant 
changes amongst noise. 
 First-up alarms: used for examining the order of occurrence of alarms. 
 
What should not be an alarm?   
 Alarms without a defined operator response. 
 Process variable or plant status changes that do not require the operator’s attention. 
 Events too fast for the operator to prevent. 
 Events that are recorded in an alarm/event log which the operator does not need to see. 
 Alarms to confirm successful operator actions. 
 Duplicate alarms (may need to be logically suppressed). 
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Effective management of an alarm system resides with designating roles and responsibilities to 
ensure organisational ownership and accountability. EEMUA 191 provides an alarm 
management organisational / flow diagram (see Figure 12) referencing clauses within EEMUA 
191 should further information be required.  
 
Alarm management and functional roles –  
 
 The steering committee (clause 3.1.1) - ideally comprises managers with a vested 
interest in improving and maintaining the alarm systems and who can provide the 
necessary resources. This committee should only meet once or twice a year. 
 
 Alarm Coordinator (clause 3.1.4) - Provides the day to day management of the alarm 
systems, taking ownership of assessment programs, databases, audit tools, analysis and 
identifies improvement opportunities within the alarm system. 
 
 Alarm assessment (rationalisation) (clause 3.1.5) - Varies based on knowledge and 
experience. Often the alarms coordinator will select and lead the assessment team based 
on the topic of focus and advise the steering committee of actions. 
 
Alarm management measuring alarm performance against metrics outlined in EEMUA 191 –  
 
 Summary alarm metrics (clause 3.1.9): Normally used to produce key performance 
indicators showing the general health of the alarm systems over defined periods 
(daily/weekly/monthly). Audience management and general users. 
 
 Detailed alarm metrics (clause 3.1.10): review the alarm performance in detail or 
greater resolution (10 minute time slices). These are particularly useful for identifying 
design issues, bad actors, standing alarms and alarm floods. 
 
 Operations reporting and feedback action (clause 3.1.11): suggests any problems 
identified in the analysis should be discussed as part of a regular operations/engineering 
maintenance meeting. Where possible causes are discussed and solutions sought from 
the various disciplines or if further resourcing is required referred to the steering 
committee for action.  
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Figure 12: Alarm system management organisation (EEMUA 191, 2013, p43) 
 
 
Fostering such a culture of accountability and continuous improvement sets this standard apart 
from other standards in the interest of industry best practice alarm management.  
 
EEMUA 191 provides information and techniques to help improve the alarm systems deemed 
to be underperforming. Table 3 shows how EEMUA 191 categorises improvement techniques 
under high, medium benefit and other. 
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Table 3: Effective techniques for improving alarm systems (EEMUA, 2013, p59) 
 
Caution should be used before actioning or implementing these techniques for improving alarm 
systems. EEMUA 191 touches on the importance of completing an initial assessment against 
current best practice benchmarks. This ensures baseline performance data is obtained and any 
improvements shall be measurable once improvements are implemented.  
 
Step so take during the initial improvement assessment are –  
 
 plan what needs to be done to improve the system 
 prioritising critical items against benchmarks 
 provide timelines to gauge the improvement process and progress 
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In all cases, changes to an alarm system requires a management of change with appropriate 
approvals outlined in the alarm philosophy and management of change procedure for each 
respective company to ensure the alarms system integrity is not jeopardised. 
 
Performance monitoring / improvements cover numerous metrics, benchmarks, key 
performance indicators and performance levels.  
 
Collated in Table 4 are two type of performance metrics, objective (quantitative) and subjective 
(qualitative). Quantitative metrics are found using software filters and query tools based on the 
alarm system recorded data stored in the historic database. Qualitative metrics consider other 
factors such as operator workload, experience, environment and other areas which can be 
difficult to assess.  
 
Operator training is briefly covered in EEMUA 191. Training should cover all realistic 
operational usages of the alarm system (EEMUA, 2013). Simulator training should expose the 
operator spurious alarms and alarm floods.  
 
To measure an operator’s workload qualitatively, EEMUA 191 formula for work rate (W) of an 
operator is calculated by the average alarm rate (R) multiplied by the average time (T) to 
respond.  
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Table 4: Summary of possible alarm metrics per operator station (EEMUA 191, 2013, p94) 
 
The UK HSE report CRR 166 published in 1998, surveyed and analysed data from various 
process industries and concluded –  
 
 Typical alarm rates in steady operation are around 1 every 2 minutes, which is hard to 
cope with on a sustained basis. 
 
 It would appear that a rate of 10 alarms per hour is generally seen as acceptable and not 
a major cause for concern. 
 
Table 5 specifies the benchmark performance metrics which are similar to ISA 18.2 
performance metric. The alarm priority distribution metric indicates how well the plant control 
system is designed and how usable it will be during high alarm loads i.e. 80% of alarms should 
be a low priority alarm. 
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Table 5: Summary of metrics and benchmark values (EEMUA 191, 2013, p99) 
 
When a large number of standing alarms occur, one may draw conclusions of poor initial design 
or on-going maintenance issues. Regular occurrence of a high number of standing alarms 
should be referred to the steering committee with evidence to justify additional maintenance 
resources to reduce the backlog of standing alarms. Another concern being long standing alarms 
may lose visibility among other alarms listed in the alarm display log. 
 
A primary key performance indicator (KPI) quantitative assessment tool comprises of four 
KPI’s. 
 
 KPI-1 - Average alarm rate - the total number of alarms annunciate to the operator / 
total number of time periods 
 
 KPI-2 - Percentage of time steady state alarm rates are outside of acceptability target 
 
 KPI-3 - Percentage of time upset alarm rates are outside of ‘acceptable’ alarm target. 
The average number of alarms for the 10 min. periods, which exceeded the ‘acceptable’ 
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target figure of less than 10. (Accumulated number of alarms/ number of 10 min. 
slices). The % time for which the system exceeded the target number. ((10*number of 
time slices / total time period in minutes) * 100). 
 
 KPI-4 - Maximum alarm rate (usually during plant upset) this is the worst case load 
during any ten minute slice. 
 
Secondary KPI consider lower value metrics which include –  
 
 Shelved alarms – target of less than < 30 shelved alarms and the duration of each 
shelved alarm 
 
 Standing / stale alarms – targets less than < 10 alarms and the duration of each alarm. 
A standing alarm becomes a stale alarm when its standing duration is greater than > 
24hrs. 
 
 Top 10 load percentage – considers the percentage of alarm occurrences (frequency) 
over the set measurement period  
 
Bad actors (high frequency repeating alarms) can be viewed as noise in an alarm system. Easily 
becoming a nuisance to an operator, nuisance alarms do not require analysis on activation once 
diagnosed. If a bad actor contributes a significant percentage of the overall alarm total (percent 
alarm load > =10%) then it is reasonable to remove it from the average calculation to better 
gauge the underlying alarm system trend. In some cases it may be necessary to shelve the bad 
actor while maintenance / engineering investigate. 
 
Table 6 summarises performance metrics in two plant states, steady and upset. The four states 
termed robust (acceptable), stable (manageable), reactive (over-demanding) and overloaded 
(unacceptable) describe the individual alarm rates in a prescriptive manner. 
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Table 6: Alarm system performance metrics (EEMUA 191, 2013, p104) 
 
To support communication of the alarm system state a colourful graph (see Table 7) is included. 
Utilising such to demonstrate an alarm state would be effective if plotted over time or after an 
improvement was implemented (Upset before change / Stable after change).  
 
Table 7: Alarm system performance (EEMUA 191, 2013, p104) 
 
The details for the four states defined can be found in EEMUA 191, should the alarm data 
analysis require reference to these tables, definitions shall be included when referred in the 
analysis.  
 
Interestingly, EEMUA has included a validation report of the metrics completed by the 
Abnormal Situation Management Consortium (ASM). ASM studied the performance metric 
prescribed in EEMUA 191 against 37 unique operator HMI consoles. ASM study found one 
third of consoles were able to achieve EEMUA 191 the normal alarm rate. However, only 2 of 
37 consoles came remotely close to the not more than 10 alarms in the first 10mins. This 
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indicated more dynamic or model based alarm handling method was required. The ASM 
Consortium concluded there was no silver bullet to achieve EEMUA 191 alarm system 
performance recommendations (EEMUA 191, 2013) 
 
In addition to the performance metrics provided, EEMUA also provides a questionnaire 
template which operators can complete. The aim of such is obtain the users impression of the 
alarm system Interestingly an alarm system may appear substandard yet the questionnaire may 
suggest otherwise. An example of an alarm systems operators questionnaire can be found in 
appendix F. 
 
In summary, ISA-18.2, IEC-62682 and EEMUA 191 support one another. EEMUA 191 
describes in detail the tools and techniques of various aspects of alarm management (e.g. 
rationalization, risk assessments, graphics design, management structure, key performance 
indicators (KPIs) and more). ISA 18.2 and IEC-62682 clearly define what is required of an 
alarm system and the overall lifecycle approach to alarm management. Based on such, there is 
enough information to determine an alarm systems performance by comparing alarm data to the 
listed benchmarks. In addition referencing corrective measures where poor performance areas 
are identified is very useful, as covered in EEMUA 191. Although the metrics are clear, the 
onus rests with those tasked with analysing the raw alarm data and presenting the results in such 
a way to gain and maintain interest and resources so the alarm systems performance does not 
degrade with time and neglect.   
 
3.2 Human Factors 
 
As part of understanding process control alarm, one must also consider or better understand 
human factors and human performance given humans (operators) are the targeted audience of 
the alarm. Human performance has been a major contributing factor to many industrial 
incidents and accidents throughout the world. Human error is documented in a number of 
thoroughly investigated, high-profile events in the nuclear power industry (Gertman et al. 
2002).  
 
In the 1990’s, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) commissioned a need to devise 
a traceable method to analyse human reliability. In 1994, in conjunction with the Idaho National 
Laboratory (INL), the Accident Sequence Precursor / Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model 
(ASP/SPAR) human reliability analysis (HRA) method was developed and used in the 
development of nuclear power plant (NPP) models. Based on experience gained in field testing, 
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this method was updated in 1999 and renamed SPAR-H, for Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-
Human Reliability Analysis method. The SPAR-H method is an adequate HRA tool for use 
with the SPAR models in performing risk analyses of operational events/conditions. 
 
SPAR’s research identified eight performance shaping factors (PSF) capable of influencing 
human performance. PSF are included in the SPAR-H quantification process these include 
(Gertman, 2005) –  
 
 Available time 
 Stress and stressors 
 Experience and training 
 Complexity 
 Ergonomics (including the human-machine interface) 
 Procedures 
 Fitness for duty 
 Work processes 
 
3.2.1 Available Time 
Available time is the amount of time operators have to diagnose an alarm condition and execute 
corrective action. Reduced available time limits the operators ability to consider alternatives 
and ultimately their ability to perform. This problem often occurs when annunciator alarm set 
points are set too close to the abnormal condition and limit the operator(s) available time to 
react and perform the necessary alleviating actions (Gertman, 2005). 
 
3.2.2 Stress/Stressors 
Stress and arousal are broadly defined, describing negative and positive motivation factors of 
human performance. SPAR-H refers to stress as undesirable conditions and circumstances 
affecting one’s ability to perform well and complete a task. Some contributing factors to stress 
include mental stress, excessive workload, physical stress (environmental factors i.e. poorly 
designed office, hot or cold environment, noise, lighting etc.), narrow attention field, muscular 
tension as well as apprehension or nervousness associated with an event. All these broadly 
define related causes of stress that can affect an operator’s mental and physical performance 
(Gertman, 2005). 
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3.2.3 Complexity 
Complexity naturally refers to the difficulty of a task performed along with the task 
environment. The greater the difficulty in performing the task increases the chance of human 
error. Mental effort such as performing mental calculations, memory requirements, 
understanding the underlying model of how the system works, and relying on knowledge 
instead of training or practice all contribute to task complexity. (Gertman, 2005) 
 
Figure 13 neatly outlines factors contributing to a tasks complexity and for metric purposes a 
highly complex task(s) would include higher ambiguity in diagnosing, prioritising and 
executing many variables and concurrency. A nominal level task complexity has no ambiguity, 
one or a few variables and is not difficult to perform. 
 
 
Figure 13: Task complexity (Gertman, 2005, p 22) 
 
3.2.4 Experience and Training 
Experience and training of operators involved in a task includes the years of experience an 
individual or crew has, training on conceived process scenarios or accidents, time since last 
scenario training and actual involvement in an operation scenario.  To gauge a metric for 
experience and training a rating score of low considers less than 6 months experience and or 
training that ensure adequate knowledge or practice required to safely perform required tasks 
during various possible abnormal operating conditions. An operator with a high level of 
experience and training would have demonstrated extensive knowledge and practiced various 
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potential scenarios, demonstrating high proficiency. It is well documented that good training 
makes operators well prepared for possible situations further demonstrated in air travel flight 
simulators and military applications. (Gertman, 2005) 
 
3.2.5 Procedures 
Formal operating procedures are vital in guiding operators on tasks and contribute towards PSF. 
Procedural problems are often identified during an incident investigation, where procedures are 
considered wrong or provide inadequate information. PSF levels differ depending on whether 
the activity is a diagnosing or action situation. SPAR-H advises when analysing the PSF 
consideration given to the task complexity, where multiple procedures and transitions between 
procedures and groups are required to support a task or grouped tasks. Where procedures are 
problematic or inadequate then the HRA analyst should assess the procedures and determine 
whether they should be assigned an inadequate or poor rating on the metric. (Gertman, 2005) 
 
3.2.6 Ergonomics and human machine interface (HMI) 
Ergonomics refers to the ease with which humans can interact with the equipment and includes 
a number of facets from room or plant layout, ease of access, lighting, chair type to limit fatigue 
and human machine interface (HMI). HMI ergonomics include the ease of interaction with the 
controller, type of displays, location to the operator console, and ease of navigating around the 
control system, screen layout, quality and quantity of information. Extensive studies have been 
conducted on the design of controller displays and will be considered in further as part of a 
graphic design alarm filter.  
An example of poor alarm annunciator design have been found where only a single 
acknowledge button is used for all alarms present at the point in time, this increases the 
probability of overseeing  alarms that may require action and hence a problem may escalate 
until diagnosed. (Gertman, 2005) 
 
3.2.7 Fit for Duty 
Fit for duty describes the physical and mental state of an individual to perform the assigned 
tasks at the required time. Sickness, fatigue, drug use (legal or illegal), personal problems and 
other distractions are known to hinder ones fitness for duty. Fit for duty includes factors 
associated with overconfidence or complacency but are not related to training, experience or 
stress. A measureable metric operator would be considering unfit for duty due to illness, 
intoxication, physical or mental incapacitation. Fit for duty means the person is healthy, fit, 
willing and able to complete the assigned task in a reasonable timeframe. (Gertman, 2005) 
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3.2.8 Work Processes 
Work processes effect performance through organisational structure, management team, safety 
culture, planning, and communication and company policies. The work flow process from 
planning, communication and execution can affect individual and team performance. Lagging 
indicators of poor management processes, communication and execution can amount to 
increased rework, maintenance program backlog, enforcement actions, turnover and 
performance inefficiencies. It is important the supervisor maintains a position of leadership in 
the control room, rather than taking over an operator role in the case of an event they are 
familiar with (often having progressed from such rank) as this would indicate a breakdown in 
work processes. (Gertman, 2005) 
 
A measure of work process success or failure could be gauged in parts from alarm systems 
analysis as well as the computerised maintenance management system. Both would reiterate 
any perceived notions by providing key performance indicators (KPI) that could be 
incorporated into the shift handover and management meeting possibly adding to individual and 
team success i.e. rework relating to effectiveness or double up of alarm system corrective work 
orders. 
 
Where there are humans involved the automated machine is in part limited by the human factor. 
The number issues involved in an alarm response have many variables both from a control 
system and human intervention. To develop a metric of performance numbers seems difficult as 
there are also social issues where a company starts to pry and/or ask personal questions about 
one’s mental or physical state at work. Hollifield and Habibi (2011) in the ISA comprehensive 
guide suggest a performance metric cannot be established. “Alarm response is not an automated 
process involving deterministic machines; it is a human cognitive process involving thought and 
analysis.” 
 
Several step have been identified which operator take to respond to an alarm (Hollifield & 
Habibi, 2011). (Refer to Figure 11 also for the Alarm State Transition Diagram) 
 
1. Detecting the alarm. 
2. Acknowledging the alarm via the HMI (often operator opt to silences the audible alarm 
and in designed cases the graphic highlighting the alarm state will change indicating 
acknowledged.) 
3. Investigates the alarm by navigating to the appropriate graphical screens to determine 
contextual information of alarm state and origin. This process involves analysing the 
process sometimes using trends to determine the alarm’s cause 
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4. Verifying the alarm ensures the alarm is not a result of hardware malfunction or 
software problem. 
5. The Operator decides on the appropriate action(s) in response to the alarm. This may be 
a direction of text selectable from the display or involve consultation with other people. 
6. Implementing the chosen action(s) is often through the HMI or control system however, 
may involve assistance from the others. In the case of a field operator the control room 
operator often makes contact via radio explains the task and wait for feedback. In cases, 
there may be a need to venture into the field to perform the necessary action or a 
combination. 
7. Monitoring the system(s) ensures the corrective action(s) performed extinguishes the 
alarm and returns the system to its operating envelope. 
 
In reference to Hollifield and Habibi (2011) suggest in relation to an operator’s process “There 
is no such thing as a single number that represents a time quantity or duration. In general, how 
much time does it take for an operator to handle an alarm?” The answers depend upon the 
alarm, the interface, system response and the operator!” This statement in part seems to concede 
defeat, yet a measure seems possible.   
 
Therefore, referring back to the ISA 18.2 standard, Figure 14 demonstrates a clear relationship 
between alarms, an operator assessment, and action in response to time.   
 
 
Figure 14: Alarm time line (ANSI/ISA 18.2, 2009, p33) 
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Figure 14 outlines the possibility of measuring time for the different alarm states that will aid 
quantifying alarm load. However, this appears singular however often operators have to juggle 
multiple alarms and or consider multiple variables. An example suggested by Hollifield and 
Habibi (2011) considers a simple tank with a high tank level alarm, unfortunately the tank has 
three inputs and three outputs either of which could be contributing to the tank high level alarm 
or even that the sensor itself has failed. This is where alarm management aids the operator 
performance through effective instrumentation and monitoring strategies. In this example, if a 
restriction at an outlet is the cause, the alarm logic if designed well, would calculate the 
required rates in and out of the tank and alert the operator to the problem prior to the tank high 
level alarm, which if exceeded may shut down or reducing fill rates based on the tank available 
capacity above high level. Also there may be preconfigured trends which will aid the operator 
identifying the cause. In this case the response time from alarm to return to normal is a 
collective measure of the human and controller’s ability or effectiveness to manage an abnormal 
situation. Where less human interaction with the controller responding to alarms measured by 
time, would indicate an effective control system.   
 
The aim is to reduce the alarm rates to a manageable level to reduce the likelihood of an alarm 
being missed or response delayed. Alarms indicate abnormal situation requiring attention, this 
indirectly is a measure the control system design and effectiveness to contain the process within 
operation envelope minimising manual intervention by an operator. The various design 
technique to reduce alarms are covered in further sections. Where human factors are concerned, 
as complex as it may seem, one must be set for success otherwise the system fails. The measure 
of success for operators will be evident through KPI’s, scenario based training, management 
support, clear communication and openness for continuous improvement. 
 
Monitoring performance in 10 minute, hourly, daily and monthly intervals greatly assists the 
visualisation of performance. How best to measure and visually present performance, depends 
on the available data and targeted audience.  Performance calculations, averaged and used in 
isolation can be misleading, so too the mean, median, standard deviation, Roche limit and other 
analysis techniques. A problem may arise with measuring and calculation of an operator’s 
workload Results may show one operator can handle another operator’s workload. Hence, this 
misleading information may lead management to consider the opportunity to reduce overhead 
by removing an operator. However, doing so would expose the company to a hazardous 
situation during an abnormal event when the second operator’s availability and skill set is 
required, quantified in the form of a risk assessment.     
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It is well documented that during alarm overload the operator’s handling capacity is exceeded 
resulting in the operator ignoring alarms. This dangerous condition leaves limited assurance the 
right alarms are being prioritised and managed, leaving cases where the wrong alarms are 
actioned resulting in incidents. Human factors play a significant role in an operator’s ability to 
respond having both inside and outside influences and complexities which constantly alter a 
human’s ability and performance. Although surveys are available (see appendix F) for 
management to implement, personal information aspects present challenges in the form of 
confidentiality and truth (example - few would suggest they are mentally unstable). In most 
cases, effective supervision and relationships, built on respect and trust will ensure transparent 
communication and minimise human factor errors.   
 
3.3 Human Machine Interface (HMI) 
 
Effective HMI in modern day processing plants has developed in leaps and bounds given the 
important role HMI’s play. The effective transfer of information between operator and human is 
vital therefore great amount of research, development and guidance though the Abnormal 
Situation Management (ASM) consortium part of Honeywell Incorporated has been completed. 
A publication released in 2007 by ASM titled Effective Operator Display Design complements 
a growing knowledgebase if effective techniques expedite an operator’s reaction to an alarm or 
abnormal condition. (Bullemer et al, 2007) 
 
Some of the simple techniques recommended by the ASM consortium include the use of grey 
scale graphic screens that change colour to highlight an alarm, location and priority levels. 
Figure 15 illustrate a grey scale display noting minimalist colour is displayed.  
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Figure 15: Grey HMI graphic example with colour alerts. (Company B graphics page) 
 
Grey scale displays appear in contrast to older colour graphic technology, colour being used to 
represent different process lines and equipment. Unfortunately although colour graphics looked 
smart they often masked subtle detail, in some cases an alarm state, delaying an operator’s 
assessment and response. Figure 16 demonstrates the older style colour HMI graphics. 
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Figure 16: Example of an older DCS graphics HMI (Company B graphics page) 
 
A study conducted in 2005 by Errington et al (2005) noted that operators using an ASM 
designed display demonstrated considerable time reductions in responding to alarms. Table 8 
compares the traditional time to respond in comparison to ASM consortiums grey scale results. 
 
Measure Traditional  ASM consortium 
Scenario time to complete (min) 18.1 10.6 
Scenario completion (%) 70 95.5 
Early Event Detection (%) 10 47.7 
   
Table 8: Measured improvements using ASM graphic guidelines (Bullemer et al, 2007, p199) 
 
Based on ASM consortiums research and guidelines into effective operator display designs, no 
further research was explored into HMI’s this area appears well researched and effective in use.  
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3.4 Company approaches to alarm management 
 
As part of this research, two companies have kindly allowed access to their alarm management 
systems. Both will remain anonymous on account of their privacy as the intended purpose is to 
explore alarms management not the companies. The Pseudonym shall be used from this point 
forward Company ‘A’ and Company ‘B’. Company ‘A’s’ alarm management system is in the 
implementation / design stage (commissioning pending), it is hoped involvement in the 
commissioning will occur while this report is being written. Company ‘B’ is a mature company 
with aging equipment and a well-established alarm management system.    
 
3.4.1 Company “A” review  
 
Researching company ‘A’ corporate alarm strategy refers the using the following industry 
accepted standards and guidelines. 
 
 IEC-62682: Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries  
 ISA 18.2-2009: Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries, published by 
the international society of automation (ISA) 
 EEMUA 191: Alarm Systems – A guide to design, management and procurement, 
published by the Engineering Equipment and Material Users Association (EEMUA) 
 
The company “A” alarm management procedure states purpose of the alarm management 
procedure is to ensure the lifecycle of alarm management systems cover key areas prescribed in 
ISA 18.2-2009 and EEMUA 191. The alarm management lifecycles include –  
 
 Identification  
 Rationalisation  
 Design 
 Role and Responsibilities 
 Management of training and competency of personnel 
 Implementation  
 Operation  
 Maintenance 
 Monitoring and Assessment  
 Assurance Review 
 Management of change (MOC) 
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Another stated functional purpose of the alarm management corporate document is to clearly 
demonstrate to the authorities and other interested parties alignment and use of industry 
accepted standards and practices in alarm management and to define key roles responsible for 
its success.  
 
Company ‘A’ has selected a software based alarm management system supplied by PAS 
Incorporated, referred to as PlantState Suite (PSS). The PSS shall be located at the head office 
and interface with the integrated control safety system (ICSS) (Yokogawa’s Exaquantum) via 
mirrored remote terminal databases (RTDB). All necessary information from the ICSS will be 
directed to the PSS including alarms, events, configuration, shelving and other relevant 
information to support, monitor and assess the alarm management system. Due to the remote 
physical locations of the interconnected facilities (4000km plus), it is vital the corporate alarms 
management system remains synchronised with each of the interconnected systems. To ensure 
the PSS system is synchronised, a periodic validation check will be completed. However, 
synchronisation issues and delays are considered to be a vulnerability of the corporate alarm 
management software reporting system. Given the PSS software is custom designed, no 
recognition of prior learning will be granted for those responsible for the PSS system. 
Therefore, only company identified personnel will be trained as super-users, and required to 
acquire specific training competency supplied by the vendor.  
 
Although Yokogawa Exaquantum has an optional alarm management system, NTPS100 
Exaplog Event Analysis Package, PSS is the preferred external alarm management suite given 
specific reporting and analysis functions.    
 
The alarm design principles align with EEMUA 191, alarms shall inform the operator of an 
abnormal condition, guide and advise actions to take allowing adequate time for the operator 
response, correcting the alarm condition parameter back to its optimum operating envelope. 
Alarms will not duplicate an action nor will they risk being potential nuisance alarms if so that 
will be rationalised.   
 
Alarm prioritisation is divided into 4 categories low, medium and high as per the risk matrix 
below.  Each priority level is associated to the highest possible consequence scenarios and 
priorities based on maximum time for the operator to control the situation and hence overt the 
considered consequence.  
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The fourth priority level not listed on the matrix is critical. Critical alarms are reserved for 
confirmed fire or gas (immediate danger), alarms identified in companies performance standard 
or where the alarm is part of an instrumented protection layer (IPL). Such cases are part of a 
safety instrumented function (SIF) requiring the operator undivided attention when in alarm 
state, as the operator is part of the equipment’s safety integrity level (SIL). The higher the level 
of safety integrity level (SIL) the lower the probability that the SIF should fail to carry out the 
required functions. It is possible during an alarm flood the operator action / monitoring may be 
distracted and SIL undermined.  This is different to other instruments that have a SIF build into 
their design providing a higher SIL however, in a few cases some instruments do not or are 
specialised and therefore require additional operator monitoring and action (SIF) to achieve a 
higher SIL level required for the application. These requirements are set out in the international 
standard IEC 61508.  
 
IEC61508 has been widely been accepted as the basis for specification, design and operation of 
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS). The company has applied strict conditions for IPL alarms; 
ensuring training is conduced so personnel understand the importance and management of such 
alarms. Included is refresher training so the operator is familiar with these types of alarms. 
There is no specification of refresher training frequency or suggestion of higher alarms event 
scenarios to familiarise the operator with considered possible scenarios and importantly allow 
the company to gauge response of the alarm system as other industries, example pilot flight 
training and the nuclear industry.  
 
The corporate standard sets out a risk-based approach for deciding the SIL for systems 
performing safety functions.   
 
 
Figure 17: Alarm prioritisation matrix (Company A, 2015, p67) 
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Company ‘A’ requires reassessment of the design if a consequence of an alarm is risk ranked 
greater the highest level of a SIF, this suggests greater than severe or the response time cannot 
achieve in the maximum time to respond. 
 
The alarm priority distribution per workstation per operator aligns with EEMUA 191 section 
6.3.4, general usability benchmarks and also appendix A3.3 - priority distribution of alarms 
table 27. By ensuring the priority distribution (Table 9) is adhered to, the operator should be 
able to effectively manage the alarms in a 12 hour shift. 
 
 
Table 9: Target Priority (Company A, 2015, p29) 
 
Alarm filtering and alarm suppression considers the following techniques in the alarm 
management procedure. 
 
To minimise nuisance alarms a technique mentioned in ISA18.2 section 10.4.3.2 is used, 
introducing a delay on or off function where other means have failed. Consideration is required 
not to limit the response time by the operator when using the suppression technique. 
 
To prevent nuisance alarms generated by fast transient analogue signals, a first order signal 
filter time constant may be applied as outlined in EEMUA table 32 – table of filter time 
constants. Caution is advised not to negatively impact the response of the controller where 
safety critical alarms are involved.  
 
The use of a hysteresis or dead band applied around the set point as an operating envelope may 
prevent alarms when the signal moves slightly off normal (set point) but in between hysteresis 
limits during normal operation. This technique is covered in EEMUA 191 and ISA18.2 (clause 
10.4.2.2) to prevent chattering and nuisance alarms. In the case of the measure variable a 
percentage hysteresis of the total devices range is limited to less than 5% for flow and level, less 
than 2% for pressure and 1% for temperature measurement and control. Hence, these 
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measurements are found to be alarming within the percentage, applying the percentage 
hysteresis is allowed in the standard.  
 
Company ‘A’ equipment notification alarms section 12.7 and 12.8, outlines notifiable alarms 
and priorities. Table 10 identifies actions required the operator and maintenance to investigate, 
yet there is no time specified to respond based on priority. This observation could be a 
suggested opportunity for improvement. Applying and reviewing alarm KPI’s assigned to 
maintenance could be measured under a standing alarm or shelved alarm. Consideration should 
also be given to work processes such as maintenance work order, approvals all amounting to the 
effort to return the alarm back to normal.  
 
  
Table 10: System diagnostic priorities (Company “A”, 2015, p38) 
 
Table 11 shows the various alarm types and the action required by the operator. In the cases 
below most require the operator to notify maintenance assigning a low priority to the condition.  
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Table 11: Equipment notification priorities (Company “A”, 2015, p 40) 
 
From an alarm management perspective the opportunity to improve the alarm system, is by first 
allowing the operator to shelve the alarm, ideally under a maintenance assigned alarm shelf, this 
would allow better distribution and accountability between production and maintenance shelved 
alarms. Potential maintenance response KPI errors based on duration of the shelved alarm could 
occur if the operator does not follow advised alarm action procedure and notify maintenance 
promptly. This error will should be minimised through a hierarchy of control by requiring 
certificate, access to shelve alarms and approval outlined in the shelving alarm condition. 
Equally, maintenance should not be penalised based on alarm acceptance, hence the response 
time would be gauged through the maintenance management system from the time the work 
order was created to closure.  
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Table 12: Alarm Shelving (Company “A”, 2015, p47) 
 
Dynamic suppression when enabled is limited to the process control system (PCS) and not the 
Safety Instrumented System (SIS). Rigorous testing and control to any logic application to 
dynamically suppress an alarm must be peer reviewed. Through the PlantState Suite any 
dynamic suppression event must be review to ensure no suppressed alarms were generated or 
critical alarms required suppressed by the logic. 
  
There is an opportunity to develop a graphic page for use during a dynamic suppression event 
giving the ability for the operator to gauge a section(s) of the plant for example depressurising a 
process system where shut off valves return to closed and depressurising valves open. In the 
event these conditions or status hasn’t been reached but may be dynamically suppressed to 
prevent alarm floods the operator can view the state of plant and request further investigation 
whilst attending to the depressurising event and potentially higher priority alarms.      
 
The alarm management strategy in section 15.2, deals with operator response to elevated alarm 
levels. The work process supports human factors during elevated alarm states by suggesting less 
operationally significant tasks must be reduced to allow the operator to focus on the abnormal 
plant state.  
 
A permitted operation KPI is calculated for each operator control console, to aid a response by 
operations while engineering or maintenance investigates the elevated alarm state. Table 13 
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shows three column tables, titled frequency, standing and flood. These alarm states help value 
each condition adding towards a collective average using the permitted operations formula 
above Table 13. It is considered as a guide when the permitted operations value increases scaled 
1-10, the operators have can use the decision matrix Table 14 to help manage decisions during 
the abnormal situation. 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Contributors to permitted operations KPI (Company A, 2015, p 54) 
 
  
Table 14: Operator response for permitted operation KPI (Company A, 2015, p 53) 
 
 It is recognised that a flood situation will be masked by an averaging filter hence there is an 
opportunity to consider other avenues to improve the analysis to better represent the KPI. An 
alarms flood is described in ISA 18.2 clause 3.3.10 as a condition where the operator cannot 
effectively handle more the 10 alarms in a 10 minute period. The start of an alarm flood occurs 
for the first regular 10 minute interval of such a rate and ends when the rate is less than 5 alarms 
per 10 minute for a regular 10minute interval.  
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Set targets have been specified for alarm rates and standing alarms as per Tables 15 and 16. 
This represents alignment with benchmark standards. 
 
 
Table 15: Acceptable alarm frequency rates KPI (Company A, 2015, p 50.) 
 
 
Table 16: Acceptable standing alarm count KPI (Company A, 2015, p 50.) 
 
Monitoring and improvements benchmarks have been recognised with reference to ISA 18.2 
clause 16.5.1, with the improved condition to reduce an average filter by reducing the sample 
time periods to monthly, weekly and hourly data samples. This will better reflect the true state 
of the control system and operator loading.  
  
The following monitoring metrics reports are proposed –  
 
Weekly –  
 
 KPI Trends (instantaneous values) 
 Alarms per hour 
 Stale alarms per hour 
 % time spent on flood 
 Number of standing alarms  
 Number of shelved alarms 
 Average alarm frequency  
 Average alarms per unit / hour 
 Average standing alarms per count 
 Average shelved alarm count 
 Maximum alarm rate over 10 minutes for the last 7 days (flood) 
 Chattering alarms  
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 Frequent alarms  
 Standing alarms 
 Shelved Alarms 
 
Additionally a monthly report will include 
 
 Number of shelved alarms in each shelve 
 Shelved alarms per shelf for the month 
 Priority distribution  
 
It is noted that the alarms rates, or number of alarms are generally measured however in 
determining and alarm priority a response times was considered as per the alarm risk matrix 
which ultimately determined the alarms priority. Therefore, in addition to the monitored 
variables suggest each console include a KPI for -   
 
 Number of shelved alarms  
 Distribution of alarms shelve used 
 Priority distribution per console 
 Time to respond  
 Average rate of time to respond  
 Max duration to respond 
 Minimum time to respond 
 Maximum time in alarm 
 Average time in alarm per alarm 
 
3.4.2 Company ‘B’ review 
 
Company ‘B’ is a mature oil and gas company with 4 producing fields APF, CPF, KMT and 
GPF all having various integrated control systems both new and old. Their alarm management 
system specifies alignment with the same standards as company ‘A’, therefore research into 
company B will focus on monitoring and assessment.  
 
An extract report of company ‘B’ (Table 17) compiles all alarms and events covering four 
facilities for a period of one week. Where the recorded data exceeds the set target, the values 
change to red allowing easy recognition for the reader. For example during this period the 
CPF’s total alarms count (annunciate and non-annunciate) was over 6.8 times the targeted alarm 
count of 1008 alarms. Furthermore, the CPF spent 6.65% percentage time in an alarm flood 
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state during this period. Aligning to ISA18.2 clause 16.9 Table 14 alarm performance metric is 
<1% of the time spent in alarm flood state. Therefore, both company and standard metrics are 
exceeded.    
 
 
Table 17: Seven day site wide analysis of alarm management system (Company “B”, 2016, data) 
 
The best performing site KMT has been used as a basis to analyse or understand the workload 
applied to the operator and system. An extract has been included as Table 18, selected from the 
alarm and events log to demonstrate alarms and events. Note the columns allocated to time, tag, 
action (ACK = Acknowledge, RTN = Return to normal and ALM = Alarm) and priority. When 
reviewing the alarm data what becomes evident is within a 5 minute window, there are lots of 
variable events, changes and alarms being logged. This would be distracting, not to mention 
potentially delaying the operator trying to start of a transfer of material between sites. 
68 
 
 
Table 18: KMT alarm event log data extract (Company “B”, 2016,) 
 
Delving further into KMT event data in Table 19, demonstrate a nuisance alarm. Alarm 9LI659 
consumes the alarm and events log as well as loads the controllers microprocessor as each 
alarm event is process almost every second.  
─
Tag Description Action
9HS607B
9HS607B
14PC544C
14PC544C
14PC544C
3TCLCMD
3TCLCMD
3TCLCMD
3TCLSTA3 ALM OFFNORM
3TCLTP18 CHECK GOBE MLV ACK OFFNORM
3TCLTP18 CHECK GOBE MLV ACK OFFNORM
3TCLSTA3 ACK OFFNORM
3TCLSTA3 ACK OFFNORM
3TCLTP16 ALM OFFNORM
3TCLTP16 ACK OFFNORM
3TCLTP16 ACK OFFNORM
7PY1063 RTN PVHI
14HS520 ALM CHNGOFST
14HS520 RTN CHNGOFST
82PIG064 ALM PVHI
82PIG056 ALM PVHI
82PIG048 ALM PVHI
Events Log
1/02/2016  12:00:00 AM 20/05/2016  12:00:00 AM
Time Unit Alarm Type
 or Parameter
Priority Current Value 
or Old Value
New Value
1/02/2016  12:20:39 AM DIESEL FUEL TRANSFER PMP KMT_0 OP STOP START
1/02/2016  12:24:49 AM DIESEL FUEL TRANSFER PMP KMT_0 OP START STOP
1/02/2016  12:26:00 AM 14P544OM KMT_1
4
PV - 1.0000
1/02/2016  12:26:00 AM 14P544OM KMT_1
4
PV - 1.0000
1/02/2016  12:26:00 AM 14P544OM KMT_1
4
PV - 1.0000
1/02/2016  12:50:17 AM 14P544OM KMT_1
4
PV - 1.0000
1/02/2016  12:50:17 AM 14P544OM KMT_1
4
PV - 1.0000
1/02/2016  12:50:17 AM 14P544OM KMT_1
4
PV - 1.0000
1/02/2016  12:53:53 AM PIC544 AUTO AND INIT SP KMT_0 PV ON ON
1/02/2016  12:53:53 AM PIC544 AUTO AND INIT SP KMT_0 PV ON ON
1/02/2016  12:53:53 AM PIC544 AUTO AND INIT SP KMT_0 PV ON ON
1/02/2016  12:54:05 AM START/STOP TRANSF SYSTEM KMT_0 OP START STOP
START STOP
1/02/2016  12:54:05 AM START/STOP TRANSF SYSTEM KMT_0 OP START STOP
KMT_0
3
ALM OFFNORM
1/02/2016  12:54:05 AM START/STOP TRANSF SYSTEM KMT_0 OP
Low OFFNORM
1/02/2016  12:54:08 AM TCL-STOPPED INITIATED KMT_0 Low OFFNORM
1/02/2016  12:54:08 AM 3TCLTP18 CHECK GOBE MLV
1/02/2016  12:54:15 AM KMT_0 Low
1/02/2016  12:54:17 AM KMT_0
1/02/2016  12:54:18 AM TCL-STOPPED INITIATED KMT_0 Low
1/02/2016  12:54:20 AM TCL-STOPPED INITIATED KMT_0
1/02/2016  12:54:33 AM GOB MLV MUST BE CLSD NOW KMT_0 High OFFNORM
1/02/2016  12:54:45 AM GOB MLV MUST BE CLSD NOW KMT_0 High
1/02/2016  12:54:47 AM GOB MLV MUST BE CLSD NOW KMT_0
1/02/2016  12:54:56 AM PS PRESSURE INTO LINE KMT_0 Journal 2150.0000 2152.36
1/02/2016  12:54:57 AM OPEN                   LOW      GOBE TIE-IN VALV C KMT_4 Low BADPV
1/02/2016  12:54:57 AM OPEN                   LOW      GOBE TIE-IN VALV C KMT_4 Low BADPV
1/02/2016  12:55:03 AM 14HS520 OPEN                   LOW      GOBE TIE-IN VALV C KMT_4 ACK CHNGOFST Low
1/02/2016  12:55:03 AM MUBI  PIGSIG  64 SAMPLES KMT_8 High 10.000000 - 10.291
1/02/2016  12:55:03 AM MUBI  PIGSIG  56 SAMPLES KMT_8 High 10.000000 126.807
1/02/2016  12:55:03 AM MUBI  PIGSIG  48 SAMPLES KMT_8 Low 10.000000 41.795
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Table 19: KMT nuisance alarm scenario extract (Company “B”, 2016) 
 
Surprisingly, company ‘B’ mature alarm systems data supports the theory that alarms will 
increase as a facility ages i.e. sensors deteriorate, controllers become sluggish. Knowing 
company ‘B’ has a rigorous monitoring and rationalisation program, sound team knowledge of 
the facilities and have the ability to tune controllers.  
 
A comparison was conducted between CPF’s 2016 alarm log in Table 17, and results obtained 
in 2013, showing company ‘B’ has improved their alarm system. In 2013 the total alarms by 
type per 24 hour period was 426, compared to 2016 weekly report shows 294 alarms per day 
(average). Note, is basic comparison does not present all the internal and external factors or 
process conditions for each years snap shot, however it is an improvement.   
9QL118TF ACK CLFALM
SWVAL ACK CLFALM
9QL118TF RTN CLFALM
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL ALM BADPV
9LI659 ALM BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL ACK BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL ACK BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL RTN BADPV
9LI659 RTN BADPV
9LI659 ACK BADPV
9LI659 ACK BADPV
9LI659 BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL ALM BADPV
9LI659 ALM BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL ACK BADPV
9LI659 ACK BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL ACK BADPV
9LI659 ACK BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL RTN BADPV
9LI659 RTN BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL ALM BADPV
9LI659 ALM BADPV
9LI659 ACK BADPV
9LI659 ACK BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL RTN BADPV
9LI659 RTN BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL ACK BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL ACK BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL ALM BADPV
9LI659 ALM BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL ACK BADPV
9LI659 ACK BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL ACK BADPV
9LI659 ACK BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL RTN BADPV
9LI659 RTN BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL ALM BADPV
9LI659 ALM BADPV
9LDI659 ODC OIL LVL ACK BADPV18/02/2016  4:08:37 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:08:36 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:08:36 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:05:50 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:05:50 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:05:49 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:05:49 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:05:48 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:05:48 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:05:47 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:05:47 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:05:18 AM KMT_09
18/02/2016  4:05:18 AM KMT_09 SHELVE Nuisance Alarm
18/02/2016  4:05:02 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:05:17 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:05:00 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:05:02 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:04:58 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:05:00 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:04:31 AM KMT_09 UNSHLV_S
18/02/2016  4:04:58 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:03:05 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:03:05 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:03:03 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:03:03 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:03:01 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:03:01 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
SHELVE Nuisance Alarm
18/02/2016  4:02:59 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:02:59 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:01:29 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09
18/02/2016  4:01:29 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09
18/02/2016  4:01:14 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:01:28 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:01:13 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:01:14 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  4:01:10 AM OC SEAWATER INTERF LVL KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:01:11 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  3:51:46 AM TRANSFER FROM PCL TO PM KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  4:01:10 AM KMT_09 High
18/02/2016  3:51:43 AM TRANSFER FROM PCL TO PM KMT_09 Low
18/02/2016  3:51:43 AM LDS Temp Switching Val KMT_09 Low
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Included in the alarm reports are the 10 most active tagged alarm combinations that appeared to 
the Operator by alarm type (Figure 18) and most frequent alarms by tag (Figure 19). 
 
 
Figure 18: Historic (2013) alarm type data of the CPF (Company “B”, 2013) 
 
The most frequent alarms in the last day graph (Figure 19) indicates 90 alarms are caused by 
4HC8677 going off is considered normal state and 4PI6008 process value (PV) falling below its 
low (LO) set point. Initial assessment suggests a work order be created for 4PI6008.PVLO 
assigning maintenance corrective and 4HC8677.OFFNORM could be researched further and 
depending on findings consider a case to rationalise a different strategy for this alarm. 
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Figure 19: Historic 24 hour most frequent alarms dated 2013 (Company “B”, 2013) 
 
Figure 20 lists CPFs top 20 bad actor alarms, clearly identified are field instruments and 
controller improvement opportunities. If dedicated resources from a maintenance and 
engineering were provided, this bad actor alarm rate would reduce, over what period such an 
improvement would make could only be determined by a sample period average and a small 
dedicated team.   
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Figure 20: CPF weekly top 20 bad actor alarms (Company “B”, 2016) 
 
Reviewing GPF weekly top twenty “Bad Actor” alarms presents a similar picture to CPF.  
GPF’s data is more concerning given there appears to be safety equipment i.e. electric fire 
pump, flame detectors and blank gas low level trip alarms performing poorly (highly active or 
faulty). This brings to question why priority codes are not included (Critical, High, and Low 
etc.) into all reports. This may not change the company’s approach to its current alarm system 
state however, those responsible for the alarm management system may direct maintenance to 
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prioritise high priority alarms over lower, even if for example the high priority alarms is 18th on 
the list.   
 
Figure 21: GPF weekly top 20 bad actor alarms (Company “B”, 2016) 
 
Lastly the figure 22 (spaning 2 pages) is a 3 week historic view of APF’s alarm system in 2014. 
Unfortunately, when compared to 2016’s weekly alarm data, there has not been an 
improvement to alarm counts. Most concerning is 2014 had a dangerously high rate of high 
priority alarms performing badly however, the improvement noted is this report includes alarm 
priority which demonstrates the ease in which one can identify high priority alarms.      
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Continued 
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Figure 22: APF 3 weekly bad actor alarms (Company “B”, 2014) 
 
In summarising the two companies reviewed. Company “B” is a great example of a mature 
company and facilities which is experiencing high alarm rates due to the aging field and system 
which is expected. Wear and tear in a mature plant can be difficult to control in an alarms 
system. Based this evidence, infant Company ‘A’ should ensure all resources  are available to 
effectively implement, maintain, manage and monitor their control and alarm system. This will 
ensure the process is optimised and limit major liability. Importantly demonstrated by both 
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companies is measuring and reporting the right information ensure correct decisions and actions 
are made during the alarm systems lifecycle. 
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4.0 Methodology 
 
4.1 Methodology 
 
The goal of this research project was to identify best practice management of industrial process 
control alarm floods. Research suggests most modern control systems will experience alarm 
floods to some degree. Therefore, the underlying problem remains. 
 
EEMUA 191 suggests advanced intelligent alarm flood processing is an active area of research 
however, to explore such a solution in this research project would require greater time than 
available, in depth software skills to develop software to interact with vendor control system as 
well as provide product lifecycle support. Considering also the functional requirements to 
annunciate alarms, any high alarm frequency rate filter, algorithm or other method (similar to an 
electronics low pass filter) limits the reaction times of an operator and may not be effective 
during a large number simultaneous alarms within a short period of time. Therefore, the concept 
of exploring a high alarm frequency suppression system at this point seems to present risk, 
however exploring better design options via a rationalisation process based on alarm 
performance analysis has merit. 
 
Organising alarms, sorted by alarm type or function also has merit by reducing alarms to the 
operator. Better organising methods entails assigning alarms affecting the process or requiring 
some action by the operator be considered production alarms, other maintenance, pre-emptive 
condition or diagnostic alarms from smart instruments allocated to a maintenance / control 
system administrator alarm log or shelved for action by a dedicated person in an assigned 
monitoring role. Although these maintenance alarms may have some pending impact to 
production, they often do not require immediate attention by the operator and therefore should 
not be routed to the operator console. Implementing an additional alarm log system for 
maintenance alarms requires caution in term of monitoring. For example a redundant 
communication network having a primary communication line failure results in no redundancy, 
although this could be considered a system alarm not requiring the operators attention, the 
potential should the redundant communication line fail, will affect production or the safety 
system, therefore this alarm should be considered a medium to high priority alarm and 
annunciate in the operators console for recording and action if a maintenance system is 
unmonitored during after business hours. 
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EEMUA 191 focuses on applying first principle strategies to better develop and manage alarm 
systems and by default, reduce alarms floods. In addition, provides performance metrics for 
benchmarking user systems data by comparison. Areas where EEMUA 191 and ISA 18.2 could 
provide more information is when developing or presenting KPIs and analysis techniques. 
Analysis techniques using various software platforms based on industry scenarios will assist 
other operators and engineers the opportunity to learn and better understand their systems, 
ultimately improving alarm management systems by mutual recognition. The importance in 
reporting techniques is similar to grey scale graphics, where too much detail masks the problem 
however tool little downplays the situation.  
 
Alarm performance data provides a holistic view on an alarm management system. A poor 
performance report highlights the need for more resources, focused rationalisation workshops, 
more specific performance metrics and other analysis techniques that will improve and aid the 
user during normal day to day operations. Often alarm system analysis is carried out 
retrospectively months or years after the alarm events, loss of production or catastrophe occurs. 
This retrospective analysis often identifies areas for improvement after the fact, therefore if 
improved within the day to day operation, problematic areas can managed before they escalate.  
The need to develop and test, key performance indicators (KPI) to provide meaningful 
information to targeted audiences at all levels of an organisation enables the audience to 
adequately understand the problem. This is vital in gaining support for a solution. Other benefits 
of effective analysis and KPIs reporting can include monitoring subtle areas of poor 
performance that would otherwise not be considered important in the day to day production. 
Subtle data can often be of interest to other departments i.e. maintenance performance, 
reoccurring breakdowns, condition monitoring mechanical reliability (spurious vibration alarm 
occurring over a period less than when scheduled monitoring is planned, could indicate 
premature failure, associated system control problems or prompt heighten monitoring 
techniques).  
 
Operator KPIs aid in the development of operators and help companies manage risk. This is 
achieved through well organised data and training scenario simulations, testing not only the 
various levels of alarm loads but also allows the operator and company to gauge assumptions in 
time to respond and operator workload. In a training program environment, operators can be 
exposed to various scenarios, providing some familiarity of how to handle a situation. KPIs 
provide feedback on an operator’s performance. This information should only be used for 
development of the operator not a demotion. KPIs also help identify specialised discipline 
knowledgebase support; during poor performance events KPIs helping build a strong case and 
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evidence for a rationalisation workshop. Also real-time performance statistics and projected flag 
similar events should they occur warranting a review or perceived event intervention.  
 
A quantitative and qualitative analysis methodology was used to measure the alarm system 
performance against EEMUA 191 and ISA 18.2 metrics (Table 20). Other methods of analysing 
alarms and event data were employed as identified to help explore and identify other alarm 
system improvement opportunities.  
 
Utilising quantitative and qualitative analysis methods, raw alarms system data was taken and 
analysed to be measured against current standard benchmarks outlined in the literature review, 
company alarm philosophies and established reporting formats. Due to the unavailability of the 
PSS software, the analysis tools utilised was Microsoft excel. The aim was to analyse the alarm 
data, determine methods that replicate the vendor software package analysis tools and 
reporting..  
 
The benefit of manually developing analysis techniques provided the opportunity to discover 
other improvement opportunities while dissecting the alarm data, in comparison to vendor 
alarm analysis packages and reports presented. Furthermore, using common software with a 
data analysis package like Microsoft excel, makes the analysis techniques available for other 
alarm system analysers who may not have the capital to afford expensive alarm analysis tools 
and packages or the access.  
 
The steps used to analyse the alarm data included – 
 
1. Identifying KPIs in relation to EEMUA 191 and ISA 18.2 (Table 20). 
2. Developing analysis methods using common software  
3. Processing and analysing alarm data 
4. Comparing the analysed data against the identified metric KPIs to identify non-
conformance 
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ISA 18.2 - Alarm performance metrics based on at least 30 days of data 
Metric Target value 
Annunciated alarms per time 
Target value: Very 
likely to be acceptable 
Target value: 
Maximum manageable 
Annunciated alarms per day per operating 
position 
150 alarms per day 300 alarms per day 
Annunciated alarms per hour per operating 
position 
6 (average) 12 (average) 
Annunciated alarms per 10 min per 
operating position 
1 (average) 2 (average) 
Metric Target value 
Percentage of hours with >30 alarms < 1% 
Percentage of 10-min periods with >10 
alarms 
< 1% 
Maximum number of alarms in a 10-min 
period 
<= 10 
Percentage of time the system is in a flood 
condition 
< 1% 
Percentage contribution of the top 10 most 
frequent alarms to the overall alarm load 
< 1% to 5% maximum, with action plan to address 
deficiencies 
Quantity of chattering and fleeting alarms Zero, develop action plans to correct any that occur 
Stale alarms < 5 per day, with action plan to address 
Annunciated priority distribution 
If using three priorities: 80% low, 15% medium, 5% 
high 
If using four priorities: 80% low, 15% medium, 5% 
high,    < 1% ‘highest’ 
Other special-purpose priorities are excluded from 
the calculation 
Unauthorised alarm suppression 
Zero alarms suppressed outside of controlled or 
approved methodologies 
Unauthorised alarm attribute changes 
Zero alarm attribute changes outside of approved 
methodologies or management of change (MOC) 
Table 20: ISA 18.2 – Performance standard (ISA 18.2, 2009) 
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In addition to comparing the alarm data against Table 20 metrics. Other analysis methods were 
employed to determine other improvements areas or results not identified. These included the 
techniques as listed below –  
 
1. Statistically (min, max, span, mean, medium and standard deviation) 
2. Cross correlation between data samples and events 
3. Histograms of alarms and events 
4. Alarm count 
5. Time correlation between events and or alarms 
6. Trending alarms based on time.  
7. Manipulation (removing bad actors or high frequency alarms to analyse data) 
8. Develop a report to display findings and analysis conclusions  
 
In some cases, the analysis results did not produce useable information. In other cases, the 
analysis provided a basis for further exploration or an explanation to help other analysis 
personnel. 
 
4.2 Resources 
 
The primary resource identified to analyse the data was a customised alarm management 
software suite developed by a company called PAS product titled Plant State Suite (PSS). PAS 
PSS is an alarm analysis software package and readily available to industry if purchased.  
Company “A” selected PAS PSS software tool for its corporate alarm management analysis and 
reporting function. PAS PSS tool analyses the alarm and event data via remote terminal 
database (RTDB) at each of its remote facilities using fibre or satellite communications. The 
downloaded data from the respective RTDB’s using fibre or satellite will be as close to real-
time as possible for processing (time lag yet to be measured due to construction delays).  
 
The intent was to use the PAS PSS software tool to develop KPI’s and analysis strategy tools to 
produce meaningful correlation between alarms, events and other alarm analysis areas of 
interest. However, due to the project delays access to PSS to analyse company 'A' alarm and 
event data was not possible. Unfortunately data from company “B” although it may be used to 
analyse the effectiveness of KPIs and reporting methods developed in PSS the approvals from 
company A could not be justified. The intent being to allow comparisons with companies ‘B’ 
current reported information to company A analysis reports.  
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The backup resource software selected was MATLAB and Microsoft excel, identified during 
the project risk assessment. Given the resources situation presented both software packages 
were tested to determine analysis suitability, with Microsoft excel proving to be the preferred 
software package. The benefit of being commonly available software package make developing 
methods potentially beneficial to other alarm system data analysers who cannot access larger 
vendor alarm management packages.    
 
The techniques used to develop excel into an alarm analysing system or processor is captured in 
appendix B. 
 
The project timeline, risk assessment, analysis of consequences and ethical implications are 
provided in the appendixes.  
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5.0 Analysis 
 
The alarm analysis in this section refers to the methodology and findings outlined in pervious 
sections. In some cases the graphs and tables relate providing graphical and statistical 
information. 
 
5.1 Percentage contribution to overall alarm load 
 
The percentage contribution to overall alarm load is considered a secondary KPI in EEMUA 
191. This metric requires analysis the alarm data to determines the overall alarm frequency rate 
and load each alarm rate places on the alarm system. ISA 18.2 specifies the percentage 
contribution of each alarm should not exceed ~ < 1% to 5% of the overall alarm load for >30 
days of alarm data.  
 
Based on the 92 days of alarm data obtained and analysed, the high frequency alarm percentage 
contribution (figure 23) shows four dominant alarms among the total alarms annunciated 
totalling 32033.  
 
 
Figure 23: top 20 alarms – Percent contribution most frequent alarm to overall alarm system load 
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The percentage contribution of each alarm was calculated and displayed in table 21. The two 
right hand side columns in Table 21 show individual percent contribution per alarm tag and the 
accumulated alarm system load percentage working down the list. The top 7 alarms exceed the 
metrics 1%. A contribution to total alarm counts  
 
The calculated results identify 7 alarms that require immediate attention to determine cause and 
rectify the problem to remove the load on the alarms system and distraction to the operator.  
 
Accumulating the percentage load the top ten alarms account for eighty percent of the total 
alarm load. Repairing these top ten alarms will have a dramatic effect on the systems 
performance.  
 
 
Table 21: Top 20 alarms – Percent contribution most frequent alarm to overall alarm system load 
 
In the event maintenance and engineering staff are able to resolve the 7 most frequent alarms, 
then the alarm system percentage distribution will resemble a more equally distributed alarm 
loaded system (Figure 24).  
TOP 20 TAG ALARM 
COUNT
% 
CONTRIBUTION 
TO TOTAL 
ALARM LOAD
ACCCUMULATED 
% ALARM LOAD
1 9LDI659 Total 8792 27.45% 27.45%
2 9LI659 Total 8745 27.30% 54.75%
3 9LI658 Total 3133 9.78% 64.53%
4 9XA662 Total 3040 9.49% 74.02%
5 82PIG048 Total 394 1.23% 75.25%
6 82PIG056 Total 367 1.15% 76.39%
7 82PIG064 Total 358 1.12% 77.51%
8 SWVAL Total 306 0.96% 78.47%
9 300J220 Total 251 0.78% 79.25%
10 84HS601 Total 227 0.71% 79.96%
11 800J220 Total 224 0.70% 80.66%
12 300JTCL Total 206 0.64% 81.30%
13 9FI139 Total 197 0.61% 81.92%
14 14HS520 Total 187 0.58% 82.50%
15 9XA687 Total 181 0.57% 83.06%
16 83HS600 Total 180 0.56% 83.63%
17 81FUELLOS Total 175 0.55% 84.17%
18 81PDH301S Total 173 0.54% 84.71%
19 9FI140 Total 173 0.54% 85.25%
20 KI_PRES Total 158 0.49% 85.75%
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However, the projected changes to the KPI measuring alarm loads < 1%, shows removing the 7 
top bad actors will see an increase in the number of alarms whose percentage alarm load is 
greater than >1% (see Table 22). Initially 7 top bad actor alarms >1% in table 21, now changes 
to >20 top bad actor alarms >1% of total alarm load Table 22. Although there is a considerable 
reduction in alarms reduced from 32033 to 7204, any KPI reports representing bad actor 
(percentage load of alarms) would show a significant increase from 7 to now >20 top alarms 
whose percentage alarm loads >1%. 
 
This projection highlights the importance of understanding proposed changes and the need to 
communicate anticipated results to key stakeholders before implementing.  
 
 
Figure 24: Top 20 percentage contribution alarms – After >1% most frequent alarm where removed 
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Table 22: Top 20 alarms – After >1% original top 7 most frequent alarms removed 
 
5.2 Annunciated alarms per day per operating position  
 
ISA 18.2 states the manageable rate of alarms per day per operating position is 150 - 300 alarms 
per day. Table 23 show the day alarm rate for the month of February 2016 however also 
includes the alarm priority distribution based on the ISA 18 performance metric. The priority 
columns are configured to change colour based on the limits specified at the top of the columns  
or as per ISA 18.2, 80% low, 15% medium, 5% high and < 1% ‘highest’ (Urgent). Green 
indicates healthy and within desired limits, yellow is marginal encroaching upper limit and red 
indicates the upper limit has been reached or exceeded.  The colours are the same for each of 
the four priority columns. The column labelled journal priority, is not annunciated to the 
operator, however is of interest for analysis/ monitoring purposes and therefore captured in the 
events log. The tally for journals alarms is low and could be utilised more.  
 
TOP 20 TAG ALARM 
COUNT
% CONTRIBUTION TO 
TOTAL ALARM LOAD
ACCCUMULATED % 
ALARM LOAD
1 SWVAL Total 306 4.25% 4.25%
2 300J220 Total 251 3.48% 7.73%
3 84HS601 Total 227 3.15% 10.88%
4 800J220 Total 224 3.11% 13.99%
5 300JTCL Total 206 2.86% 16.85%
6 9FI139 Total 197 2.73% 19.59%
7 14HS520 Total 187 2.60% 22.18%
8 9XA687 Total 181 2.51% 24.69%
9 83HS600 Total 180 2.50% 27.19%
10 81FUELLOS Total 175 2.43% 29.62%
11 81PDH301S Total 173 2.40% 32.02%
12 9FI140 Total 173 2.40% 34.43%
13 KI_PRES Total 158 2.19% 36.62%
14 14HS521 Total 148 2.05% 38.67%
15 KO_PRES Total 142 1.97% 40.64%
16 14PDH525 Total 137 1.90% 42.55%
17 9PI319 Total 111 1.54% 44.09%
18 84IC1PIR Total 109 1.51% 45.60%
19 84QA604 Total 81 1.12% 46.72%
20 $CONSOLE01 Total 77 1.07% 47.79%
32033
Less >1% MOST FREQUENT 
THE  TOTAL COUNT 
BECOMES
7204
IF IMPROVED - TOP 20 MOST FREQUENT ALARMS
GRAND TOTAL OF ALL ALARMS 
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Based on the colour changes, the observer can easily identify poor performance areas and where 
necessary further analyse. As can be seen Figure 23 most of February alarm rates exceed the 
KPI’s with the majority of alarms high priority. The same can be viewed in Figure 24 and 25. 
 
 
Table 23: Total alarms per day and alarm priority distribution per day for February 2016  
 
For comparison purposes, Figure 25 bar graph with limit line was created to show the same data 
as Table 22. 
FLOOR 1hr Time High Journal Low Urgent Grand Total
KPI 150-300 
ALM/day High < 5% Journal = N/A Low < 80% Urgent < 1%
Grand Total 1/02/2016 32 11 414 457 457 7.00% 2.41% 90.59% 0.00%
Grand Total 2/02/2016 1 8 5 14 14 7.14% 57.14% 35.71% 0.00%
Grand Total 3/02/2016 39 15 156 1 211 211 18.48% 7.11% 73.93% 0.47%
Grand Total 4/02/2016 104 21 390 1 516 516 20.16% 4.07% 75.58% 0.19%
Grand Total 5/02/2016 116 35 154 1 306 306 37.91% 11.44% 50.33% 0.33%
Grand Total 6/02/2016 160 20 237 1 418 418 38.28% 4.78% 56.70% 0.24%
Grand Total 7/02/2016 169 22 206 1 398 398 42.46% 5.53% 51.76% 0.25%
Grand Total 8/02/2016 152 4 205 361 361 42.11% 1.11% 56.79% 0.00%
Grand Total 9/02/2016 107 5 173 2 287 287 37.28% 1.74% 60.28% 0.70%
Grand Total 10/02/2016 111 10 127 248 248 44.76% 4.03% 51.21% 0.00%
Grand Total 11/02/2016 98 18 116 1 233 233 42.06% 7.73% 49.79% 0.43%
Grand Total 12/02/2016 97 5 90 192 192 50.52% 2.60% 46.88% 0.00%
Grand Total 13/02/2016 195 9 242 446 446 43.72% 2.02% 54.26% 0.00%
Grand Total 14/02/2016 42 10 45 97 97 43.30% 10.31% 46.39% 0.00%
Grand Total 15/02/2016 115 18 188 4 325 325 35.38% 5.54% 57.85% 1.23%
Grand Total 16/02/2016 168 26 162 356 356 47.19% 7.30% 45.51% 0.00%
Grand Total 17/02/2016 251 19 266 536 536 46.83% 3.54% 49.63% 0.00%
Grand Total 18/02/2016 269 12 271 1 553 553 48.64% 2.17% 49.01% 0.18%
Grand Total 19/02/2016 383 10 406 799 799 47.93% 1.25% 50.81% 0.00%
Grand Total 20/02/2016 182 3 183 368 368 49.46% 0.82% 49.73% 0.00%
Grand Total 21/02/2016 27 9 68 104 104 25.96% 8.65% 65.38% 0.00%
Grand Total 22/02/2016 17 18 31 1 67 67 25.37% 26.87% 46.27% 1.49%
Grand Total 23/02/2016 21 15 37 2 75 75 28.00% 20.00% 49.33% 2.67%
Grand Total 24/02/2016 158 6 188 352 352 44.89% 1.70% 53.41% 0.00%
Grand Total 25/02/2016 412 8 565 985 985 41.83% 0.81% 57.36% 0.00%
Grand Total 26/02/2016 387 13 496 896 896 43.19% 1.45% 55.36% 0.00%
Grand Total 27/02/2016 149 14 169 332 332 44.88% 4.22% 50.90% 0.00%
Grand Total 28/02/2016 54 5 64 123 123 43.90% 4.07% 52.03% 0.00%
Grand Total 29/02/2016 23 31 58 1 113 113 20.35% 27.43% 51.33% 0.88%
350.62069 36.86% 8.20% 54.62% 0.31%
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Figure 25: Daily total alarms per day for February 2016 
 
Table 24: Total alarms per day and alarm priority distribution per day for March 2016 
FLOOR 1hr Time High Journal Low Urgent Grand Total
KPI 150-300 
ALM/day High < 5% Journal = N/A Low < 80% Urgent < 1%
Grand Total 1/03/2016 6 13 31 1 51 51 11.76% 25.49% 60.78% 1.96%
Grand Total 2/03/2016 4 8 29 41 41 9.76% 19.51% 70.73% 0.00%
Grand Total 3/03/2016 29 22 66 117 117 24.79% 18.80% 56.41% 0.00%
Grand Total 4/03/2016 40 7 69 116 116 34.48% 6.03% 59.48% 0.00%
Grand Total 5/03/2016 16 16 41 73 73 21.92% 21.92% 56.16% 0.00%
Grand Total 6/03/2016 25 35 78 138 138 18.12% 25.36% 56.52% 0.00%
Grand Total 7/03/2016 4 4 20 1 29 29 13.79% 13.79% 68.97% 3.45%
Grand Total 8/03/2016 14 9 36 59 59 23.73% 15.25% 61.02% 0.00%
Grand Total 9/03/2016 45 14 73 132 132 34.09% 10.61% 55.30% 0.00%
Grand Total 10/03/2016 107 23 225 4 359 359 29.81% 6.41% 62.67% 1.11%
Grand Total 11/03/2016 46 15 113 174 174 26.44% 8.62% 64.94% 0.00%
Grand Total 12/03/2016 28 12 60 100 100 28.00% 12.00% 60.00% 0.00%
Grand Total 13/03/2016 93 20 126 1 240 240 38.75% 8.33% 52.50% 0.42%
Grand Total 14/03/2016 26 13 41 2 82 82 31.71% 15.85% 50.00% 2.44%
Grand Total 15/03/2016 45 30 565 640 640 7.03% 4.69% 88.28% 0.00%
Grand Total 16/03/2016 57 19 513 589 589 9.68% 3.23% 87.10% 0.00%
Grand Total 17/03/2016 24 19 52 95 95 25.26% 20.00% 54.74% 0.00%
Grand Total 18/03/2016 33 24 552 609 609 5.42% 3.94% 90.64% 0.00%
Grand Total 19/03/2016 183 6 680 869 869 21.06% 0.69% 78.25% 0.00%
Grand Total 20/03/2016 114 39 426 579 579 19.69% 6.74% 73.58% 0.00%
Grand Total 21/03/2016 191 7 222 420 420 45.48% 1.67% 52.86% 0.00%
Grand Total 22/03/2016 120 31 207 358 358 33.52% 8.66% 57.82% 0.00%
Grand Total 23/03/2016 371 36 427 1 835 835 44.43% 4.31% 51.14% 0.12%
Grand Total 24/03/2016 50 57 166 273 273 18.32% 20.88% 60.81% 0.00%
Grand Total 25/03/2016 34 19 288 4 345 345 9.86% 5.51% 83.48% 1.16%
Grand Total 26/03/2016 137 17 425 579 579 23.66% 2.94% 73.40% 0.00%
Grand Total 27/03/2016 388 31 592 1 1012 1012 38.34% 3.06% 58.50% 0.10%
Grand Total 28/03/2016 138 38 205 2 383 383 36.03% 9.92% 53.52% 0.52%
Grand Total 29/03/2016 24 15 68 2 109 109 22.02% 13.76% 62.39% 1.83%
Grand Total 30/03/2016 25 17 30 72 72 34.72% 23.61% 41.67% 0.00%
Grand Total 31/03/2016 157 80 217 454 454 34.58% 17.62% 47.80% 0.00%
320.387097 25.04% 11.59% 62.95% 0.42%
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Figure 26: Daily total alarms per day for February 2016 
 
Table 25: Total alarms per day and alarm priority distribution per day for April 2016 
FLOOR 1hr Time High Journal Low Urgent Grand Total
KPI 150-300 
ALM/day High < 5% Journal = N/A Low < 80% Urgent < 1%
Grand Total 1/04/2016 259 25 347 631 631 41.05% 3.96% 54.99% 0.00%
Grand Total 2/04/2016 188 50 287 525 525 35.81% 9.52% 54.67% 0.00%
Grand Total 3/04/2016 317 12 423 1 753 753 42.10% 1.59% 56.18% 0.13%
Grand Total 4/04/2016 442 21 832 1 1296 1296 34.10% 1.62% 64.20% 0.08%
Grand Total 5/04/2016 363 3 850 1216 1216 29.85% 0.25% 69.90% 0.00%
Grand Total 6/04/2016 347 15 677 1039 1039 33.40% 1.44% 65.16% 0.00%
Grand Total 7/04/2016 294 11 708 2 1015 1015 28.97% 1.08% 69.75% 0.20%
Grand Total 8/04/2016 457 21 850 1328 1328 34.41% 1.58% 64.01% 0.00%
Grand Total 9/04/2016 400 20 612 2 1034 1034 38.68% 1.93% 59.19% 0.19%
Grand Total 10/04/2016 221 24 323 2 570 570 38.77% 4.21% 56.67% 0.35%
Grand Total 11/04/2016 57 27 74 158 158 36.08% 17.09% 46.84% 0.00%
Grand Total 12/04/2016 29 49 57 1 136 136 21.32% 36.03% 41.91% 0.74%
Grand Total 13/04/2016 49 15 96 3 163 163 30.06% 9.20% 58.90% 1.84%
Grand Total 14/04/2016 8 11 32 51 51 15.69% 21.57% 62.75% 0.00%
Grand Total 15/04/2016 15 30 22 67 67 22.39% 44.78% 32.84% 0.00%
Grand Total 16/04/2016 43 22 87 1 153 153 28.10% 14.38% 56.86% 0.65%
Grand Total 17/04/2016 54 38 167 7 266 266 20.30% 14.29% 62.78% 2.63%
Grand Total 18/04/2016 40 28 115 183 183 21.86% 15.30% 62.84% 0.00%
Grand Total 19/04/2016 25 268 404 697 697 3.59% 38.45% 57.96% 0.00%
Grand Total 20/04/2016 52 39 91 1 183 183 28.42% 21.31% 49.73% 0.55%
Grand Total 21/04/2016 15 58 35 1 109 109 13.76% 53.21% 32.11% 0.92%
Grand Total 22/04/2016 5 5 14 24 24 20.83% 20.83% 58.33% 0.00%
Grand Total 23/04/2016 15 2 23 40 40 37.50% 5.00% 57.50% 0.00%
Grand Total 24/04/2016 49 90 315 9 463 463 10.58% 19.44% 68.03% 1.94%
Grand Total 25/04/2016 21 17 32 70 70 30.00% 24.29% 45.71% 0.00%
Grand Total 26/04/2016 31 9 32 72 72 43.06% 12.50% 44.44% 0.00%
Grand Total 27/04/2016 25 25 32 1 83 83 30.12% 30.12% 38.55% 1.20%
Grand Total 28/04/2016 4 21 5 30 30 13.33% 70.00% 16.67% 0.00%
Grand Total 29/04/2016 97 17 18 132 132 73.48% 12.88% 13.64% 0.00%
430.586207 29.57% 17.51% 52.52% 0.39%
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Figure 27: Daily total alarms per day for February 2016 
 
Of the 92 days sampled 53% or 49 days, the alarm rate was under ISA 18.2 metric of maximum 
manageable alarms < 300 alarms per day (see Figure 28 and Table 26). Therefore, 47% of the 
sample period or 43 days are considered unmanageable, given they exceed the 300 alarms per 
day. 
 
 
Figure 28: Surveyed period daily alarm rate distribution 
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Referencing Table 26, 7.6% of daily alarm rates over the 92 days have an alarm rate above 
1000 alarms per day. 
 
 
Table 26: Surveyed period daily alarm rate distribution 
 
Based the results in Table 26 it seems reasonable to expect the monthly alarm average analysis 
in Table 27 to shows the distribution of alarms and with month experienced the higher alarm 
rates. The KPI column 150-300 alarms / day are exceeded for all three months. The high alarm 
priority expected to be < 5% averages from 25% to 36% for the 3 months and the low priority is 
underutilised having capacity of 80% yet only registers 50-60% low priority alarms. Based on 
the results further analysis is required to determine if the alarm priorities can be reallocated to 
improve the alarm priority distribution.    
 
 
Table 27: Monthly average of alarms per day 
 
BIN - ALM Rate/ day 
distribution
Frequency 
over days 
surveyed
Frequency % 
total days 
surveyed
% 
Accumulated 
total
0 0 0.00% 0.00%
50 6 6.52% 6.52%
100 17 18.48% 25.00%
150 12 13.04% 38.04%
200 7 7.61% 45.65%
250 4 4.35% 50.00%
300 3 3.26% 53.26%
350 4 4.35% 57.61%
400 8 8.70% 66.30%
450 3 3.26% 69.57%
500 3 3.26% 72.83%
550 3 3.26% 76.09%
600 5 5.43% 81.52%
650 3 3.26% 84.78%
700 1 1.09% 85.87%
750 0 0.00% 85.87%
800 2 2.17% 88.04%
850 1 1.09% 89.13%
900 2 2.17% 91.30%
950 0 0.00% 91.30%
1000 1 1.09% 92.39%
More 7 7.61% 100.00%
Total Days Surveyed 92
ALARM DISTRIBUTION PER DAY FOR 92 DAYS
KPI 150-300 
ALM/day
High < 5%
Journal = 
N/A
Low < 80% Urgent < 1%
350.62069 36.86% 8.20% 54.62% 0.31%
320.387097 25.04% 11.59% 62.95% 0.42%
430.586207 29.57% 17.51% 52.52% 0.39%APRIL MONTHLY AVERAGE 
MONTHLY ALARM AVERAGE ANALYSIS
ANALYSIS TO ISA 18.2 STANDARD
ALARM DATA PER MONTH
FEBRUARY MONTHLY AVERAGE 
MARCH MONTHLY AVERAGE 
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In terms of drawing the observer’s attention to areas of interest, the coloured tables present poor 
performances with greater impact than the bar charts. Although the daily alarm average not set 
to change colour when limits are exceeded provides a reasonable quick glance overview of the 
systems performance.  
 
5.3 Annunciated alarms per hour per operating position  
 
The next performance metric from 18.2 is the annunciated alarms per hour per operating 
position, targeting ~6 to ~12 alarms per hour (average). Similar to the daily analysis, the hourly 
analysis enables the observer focus on hours of non-conformance. This is particularly useful in 
pinpointing the hours requiring for specific trending / analysis. 
Note – Only the hours where an alarm has occurred are included in the table analysed. 
 
 
Table 28: Snap shot #1 - alarms per hour with alarm priority distribution  
 
FLOOR 1hr Time High Journal Low Urgent Grand Total KPI 6-12 
ALM/Hr
High < 5% Journal = N/A Low < 80% Urgent < 1%
0:00 1/02/2016 8 8 16 16 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00%
1:00 1/02/2016 4 5 9 9 44.44% 0.00% 55.56% 0.00%
2:00 1/02/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6:00 1/02/2016 1 8 9 9 11.11% 88.89% 0.00% 0.00%
9:00 1/02/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00%
15:00 1/02/2016 6 150 156 156 3.85% 0.00% 96.15% 0.00%
16:00 1/02/2016 10 250 260 260 3.85% 0.00% 96.15% 0.00%
17:00 1/02/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
19:00 1/02/2016 2 2 2 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0:00 2/02/2016 6 2 8 8 0.00% 75.00% 25.00% 0.00%
14:00 2/02/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00%
16:00 2/02/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
23:00 2/02/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5:00 3/02/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
8:00 3/02/2016 6 2 103 111 111 5.41% 1.80% 92.79% 0.00%
9:00 3/02/2016 14 21 35 35 40.00% 0.00% 60.00% 0.00%
10:00 3/02/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
13:00 3/02/2016 2 2 2 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
14:00 3/02/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
15:00 3/02/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
16:00 3/02/2016 2 2 4 4 0.00% 50.00% 50.00% 0.00%
17:00 3/02/2016 2 2 4 4 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00%
18:00 3/02/2016 11 6 17 1 35 35 31.43% 17.14% 48.57% 2.86%
19:00 3/02/2016 2 4 7 13 13 15.38% 30.77% 53.85% 0.00%
21:00 3/02/2016 2 2 2 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
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Table 29: Snap shot #2 - alarms per hour with alarm priority distribution  
 
Given only the hours having alarms were compiled to provide results for comparison against the 
KPI (Tables 28, 29 and 30), this could be misinterpreted as an indication of the complete 
period. When comparing the alarm rate averages against the total hour periods (24 per day) for 
each month the average, as expected falls dramatically (Table 31) and April is now within 
hourly KPI tolerance. Comparing Tables 30 and 31, demonstrates the pitfalls of averages. In 
terms of best practice alarm management Table 30 provide a true reflection of the average 
alarm rate during the hour periods when an alarm occurs. In contrast to Table 31, Aprils alarm 
rate is manageable (9.32 alarms / hour) yet February and March just unmanageable (13.3 and 
14.6 alarms / hour).  
 
 
Table 30: Monthly average alarm rate per hour 
FLOOR 1hr Time High Journal Low Urgent Grand Total KPI 6-12 
ALM/Hr
High < 5% Journal = N/A Low < 80% Urgent < 1%
0:00 25/02/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00%
1:00 25/02/2016 28 2 36 66 66 42.42% 3.03% 54.55% 0.00%
2:00 25/02/2016 29 50 79 79 36.71% 0.00% 63.29% 0.00%
3:00 25/02/2016 26 33 59 59 44.07% 0.00% 55.93% 0.00%
4:00 25/02/2016 22 27 49 49 44.90% 0.00% 55.10% 0.00%
5:00 25/02/2016 24 40 64 64 37.50% 0.00% 62.50% 0.00%
6:00 25/02/2016 41 64 105 105 39.05% 0.00% 60.95% 0.00%
7:00 25/02/2016 30 33 63 63 47.62% 0.00% 52.38% 0.00%
8:00 25/02/2016 6 6 12 12 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00%
9:00 25/02/2016 1 1 1 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
10:00 25/02/2016 1 2 3 3 33.33% 66.67% 0.00% 0.00%
13:00 25/02/2016 2 4 6 6 33.33% 0.00% 66.67% 0.00%
14:00 25/02/2016 29 2 35 66 66 43.94% 3.03% 53.03% 0.00%
15:00 25/02/2016 34 2 50 86 86 39.53% 2.33% 58.14% 0.00%
16:00 25/02/2016 28 40 68 68 41.18% 0.00% 58.82% 0.00%
17:00 25/02/2016 28 36 64 64 43.75% 0.00% 56.25% 0.00%
18:00 25/02/2016 36 51 87 87 41.38% 0.00% 58.62% 0.00%
19:00 25/02/2016 33 46 79 79 41.77% 0.00% 58.23% 0.00%
20:00 25/02/2016 12 12 24 24 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00%
21:00 25/02/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00%
0:00 26/02/2016 1 1 1 3 3 33.33% 33.33% 33.33% 0.00%
1:00 26/02/2016 5 2 5 12 12 41.67% 16.67% 41.67% 0.00%
2:00 26/02/2016 33 39 72 72 45.83% 0.00% 54.17% 0.00%
3:00 26/02/2016 31 36 67 67 46.27% 0.00% 53.73% 0.00%
4:00 26/02/2016 25 40 65 65 38.46% 0.00% 61.54% 0.00%
5:00 26/02/2016 35 50 85 85 41.18% 0.00% 58.82% 0.00%
6:00 26/02/2016 30 1 43 74 74 40.54% 1.35% 58.11% 0.00%
7:00 26/02/2016 31 33 64 64 48.44% 0.00% 51.56% 0.00%
8:00 26/02/2016 4 1 6 11 11 36.36% 9.09% 54.55% 0.00%
10:00 26/02/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
13:00 26/02/2016 2 1 2 5 5 40.00% 20.00% 40.00% 0.00%
14:00 26/02/2016 6 7 13 13 46.15% 0.00% 53.85% 0.00%
15:00 26/02/2016 50 6 62 118 118 42.37% 5.08% 52.54% 0.00%
16:00 26/02/2016 24 1 40 65 65 36.92% 1.54% 61.54% 0.00%
17:00 26/02/2016 30 38 68 68 44.12% 0.00% 55.88% 0.00%
18:00 26/02/2016 28 33 61 61 45.90% 0.00% 54.10% 0.00%
19:00 26/02/2016 40 47 87 87 45.98% 0.00% 54.02% 0.00%
20:00 26/02/2016 12 12 24 24 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00%
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KPI 6-12 
ALM/Hr
High < 5%
Journal = 
N/A
Low < 80% Urgent < 1%
21.7730193 36.11% 13.28% 50.24% 0.37%
18.5992509 22.62% 14.67% 62.41% 0.30%
25.6934156 26.69% 18.98% 53.60% 0.72%
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Table 31: Monthly alarms averaged over the total 24 hour periods per month 
 
Based on the above, further data analysis was conducted to determine the distribution of hourly 
alarms rates. This was achieved using a histogram (Figure 29) distributing the one hourly alarm 
rates over the 92 day sample period. The frequency of alarm rate per hour referencing the 
manageable target ~6 to ~12 alarms per hour (average) accounts for 60% of alarms rates (table 
32). Surprisingly, the histogram shows an increase in alarm distribution around the 48-96 
alarms per hour, this blemish attracts attention for further investigation to find out why this 
alarm rate increased when it should have be tapering off left to right as the alarm rates increase. 
 
 
Figure 29: Hourly alarm rate distribution histogram for surveyed duration  
   
KPI 6-12 
ALM/Hr
High < 5%
Journal = 
N/A
Low < 80% Urgent < 1%
14.6091954 24.23% 8.91% 33.71% 0.25%
13.3494624 16.23% 10.53% 44.79% 0.22%
9.32160734 11.33% 7.35% 31.28% 0.15%APRIL HOURLY AVERAGE (ALL HOURS PER MONTH INLCUDED)
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FEBRUARY HOURLY AVERAGE (ALL HOURS PER MONTH INLCUDED)
MARCH HOURLY AVERAGE (ALL HOURS PER MONTH INLCUDED)
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Table 32: Hourly alarm distribution with accumulated percentage  
 
The hourly alarm rate demonstrates its effectiveness in narrowing high alarm rates to hour 
periods. However use caution when averaging alarm rates over time as demonstrated the results 
may appear good or bad.    
 
5.4 Percentage of hours with >30 alarms 
 
Using the hourly data periods from above, a comparison to the hourly alarm rate provides the 
percentage of hours with alarm rates > 30 alarms per hour. The target is less than < 1%.  
The results in Table 33 show excessively high percentage of alarms > 30 alarms per hour in 
comparison to the < 1% target.  
 
 
Table 33: Percentage of hours with >30 alarms per hour 
 
  
ALARM 
DISTRIBUTION / 
HR
FREQUENCY 
Frequency % 
distribution / 
BIN
Accumulated 
total
0 0 0.00% 0.00%
3 518 34.01% 34.01%
6 199 13.07% 47.08%
9 119 7.81% 54.89%
12 90 5.91% 60.80%
15 62 4.07% 64.87%
18 54 3.55% 68.42%
21 29 1.90% 70.32%
24 44 2.89% 73.21%
48 177 11.62% 84.83%
96 195 12.80% 97.64%
128 20 1.31% 98.95%
164 3 0.20% 99.15%
200 3 0.20% 99.34%
236 3 0.20% 99.54%
272 3 0.20% 99.74%
308 1 0.07% 99.80%
344 0 0.00% 99.80%
380 0 0.00% 99.80%
416 0 0.00% 99.80%
452 1 0.07% 99.87%
More 2 0.13% 100.00%
Sample Count 1523
ALARM DISTRIBUTION PER 1 HR FOR 92 
DAYS
February March April
122 82 149
696 744 696
17.53% 11.02% 21.41%
Hours / month
Percentage 
Percentage of hours with >30 alarms - target <1%
Month
Hours >30 Alarms
96 
 
5.5 Annunciated alarms per 10 min per operating position 
 
Analysing the annunciated alarms per 10 min per operating position, gauging the acceptable 
alarm rate < 1 alarm/ 10mins or maximum manageable alarm rate of < 2 alarms / 10mins both 
averaged.  
 
The 10 min. period performance metric tables include an additional metric column to highlight 
alarm floods. The alarm flood column identified by the amber box determines alarms for each 
10 min. period, if the alarm rates greater that10 alarms per 10 min. the alarm system is in flood. 
The amber column signifies alarm floods and is set to change colour to allow the observer to 
see which 10 minute periods during the day are in alarm flood. 
 
 
Table 34: Annunciated alarms per 10 min per operating position (3 days in February analysis sample)  
FLOOR 10min Time High Journal Low Urgent Grand Total
ALM ~1-2 / 
10min High < 5% Journal (N/A) Low < 80% Urgent > 1%
ALM > 10 / 
10min
0:50 1/02/16 8 8 16 16 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 16
1:00 1/02/16 4 5 9 9 44.44% 0.00% 55.56% 0.00% 9
2:40 1/02/16 1 1 1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
6:40 1/02/16 1 8 9 9 11.11% 88.89% 0.00% 0.00% 9
9:00 1/02/16 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1
9:10 1/02/16 1 1 1 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
15:40 1/02/16 23 23 23 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 23
15:50 1/02/16 6 127 133 133 4.51% 0.00% 95.49% 0.00% 133
16:00 1/02/16 5 131 136 136 3.68% 0.00% 96.32% 0.00% 136
16:10 1/02/16 5 119 124 124 4.03% 0.00% 95.97% 0.00% 124
17:10 1/02/16 2 2 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
19:40 1/02/16 2 2 2 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
0:30 2/02/16 6 2 8 8 0.00% 75.00% 25.00% 0.00% 8
14:40 2/02/16 1 1 2 2 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 2
16:40 2/02/16 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
23:00 2/02/16 2 2 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
5:50 3/02/16 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1
8:40 3/02/16 47 47 47 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 47
8:50 3/02/16 6 2 56 64 64 9.38% 3.13% 87.50% 0.00% 64
9:00 3/02/16 8 10 18 18 44.44% 0.00% 55.56% 0.00% 18
9:10 3/02/16 6 10 16 16 37.50% 0.00% 62.50% 0.00% 16
9:20 3/02/16 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1
10:20 3/02/16 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1
13:50 3/02/16 2 2 2 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
14:00 3/02/16 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
15:30 3/02/16 1 1 1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
16:20 3/02/16 2 2 4 4 0.00% 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 4
17:20 3/02/16 1 2 3 3 33.33% 0.00% 66.67% 0.00% 3
17:50 3/02/16 1 1 1 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
18:10 3/02/16 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1
18:20 3/02/16 4 4 8 8 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 8
18:30 3/02/16 2 2 2 6 6 33.33% 33.33% 33.33% 0.00% 6
18:40 3/02/16 5 4 10 1 20 20 25.00% 20.00% 50.00% 5.00% 20
19:00 3/02/16 1 6 7 7 0.00% 14.29% 85.71% 0.00% 7
19:40 3/02/16 2 3 1 6 6 33.33% 50.00% 16.67% 0.00% 6
21:20 3/02/16 1 1 1 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
21:50 3/02/16 1 1 1 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
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The next two tables (Table 34 and 35) highlight the contrast between alarms rates and alarm 
floods. The beginning of April appears more active in comparison to March. 
 
Table 35: Annunciated alarms per 10 min per operating position (3 days in March analysis sample)  
FLOOR 10min Time High Journal Low Urgent Grand Total
ALM ~1-2 / 
10min High < 5% Journal (N/A) Low < 80% Urgent > 1%
ALM > 10 / 
10min
0:50:00 1/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
1:50:00 1/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
2:30:00 1/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
2:40:00 1/03/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1
3:40:00 1/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
5:40:00 1/03/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1
5:50:00 1/03/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1
7:00:00 1/03/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
7:10:00 1/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
7:20:00 1/03/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
7:30:00 1/03/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
7:50:00 1/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
8:10:00 1/03/2016 2 1 3 3 66.67% 0.00% 33.33% 0.00% 3
8:30:00 1/03/2016 2 2 2 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
8:40:00 1/03/2016 1 1 1 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
9:00:00 1/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
10:50:00 1/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
11:30:00 1/03/2016 2 8 1 11 11 0.00% 18.18% 72.73% 9.09% 11
12:20:00 1/03/2016 2 3 5 5 0.00% 40.00% 60.00% 0.00% 5
12:40:00 1/03/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1
15:20:00 1/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
20:50:00 1/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
23:50:00 1/03/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1
1:20:00 2/03/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 2
2:40:00 2/03/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1
3:50:00 2/03/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1
12:00:00 2/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
13:10:00 2/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
15:10:00 2/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
17:10:00 2/03/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1
19:30:00 2/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
20:20:00 2/03/2016 1 2 3 3 33.33% 0.00% 66.67% 0.00% 3
20:30:00 2/03/2016 4 4 4 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 4
20:40:00 2/03/2016 2 3 5 5 0.00% 40.00% 60.00% 0.00% 5
21:00:00 2/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
21:10:00 2/03/2016 2 3 5 5 0.00% 40.00% 60.00% 0.00% 5
21:40:00 2/03/2016 1 5 6 6 16.67% 0.00% 83.33% 0.00% 6
22:10:00 2/03/2016 1 1 1 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
23:50:00 2/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
3:50:00 3/03/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
4:20:00 3/03/2016 1 1 1 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
6:50:00 3/03/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
7:00:00 3/03/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
7:10:00 3/03/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
7:50:00 3/03/2016 2 3 5 5 40.00% 60.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5
8:00:00 3/03/2016 1 1 1 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
8:40:00 3/03/2016 1 1 1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1
8:50:00 3/03/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
11:40:00 3/03/2016 1 2 3 3 33.33% 0.00% 66.67% 0.00% 3
11:50:00 3/03/2016 1 2 3 3 33.33% 0.00% 66.67% 0.00% 3
12:00:00 3/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
12:20:00 3/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
12:30:00 3/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
13:00:00 3/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
13:10:00 3/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
13:20:00 3/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
13:30:00 3/03/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
13:40:00 3/03/2016 1 4 5 5 20.00% 0.00% 80.00% 0.00% 5
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Table 36: Annunciated alarms per 10 min per operating position (1st of April analysis sample)  
FLOOR 10min Time High Journal Low Urgent Grand Total
ALM ~1-2 / 
10min High < 5% Journal (N/A) Low < 80% Urgent > 1%
ALM > 10 / 
10min
0:00 1/04/2016 7 10 17 17 41.18% 0.00% 58.82% 0.00% 17
0:10 1/04/2016 6 6 12 12 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 12
0:20 1/04/2016 8 8 16 16 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 16
0:30 1/04/2016 6 6 12 12 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 12
0:40 1/04/2016 4 5 9 9 44.44% 0.00% 55.56% 0.00% 9
0:50 1/04/2016 2 2 4 4 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 4
1:00 1/04/2016 2 2 4 4 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 4
1:10 1/04/2016 3 3 6 6 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 6
1:20 1/04/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 2
1:30 1/04/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 2
1:40 1/04/2016 1 2 3 3 33.33% 0.00% 66.67% 0.00% 3
8:10 1/04/2016 1 2 3 3 0.00% 33.33% 66.67% 0.00% 3
8:20 1/04/2016 1 1 2 2 0.00% 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 2
9:50 1/04/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 2
10:00 1/04/2016 2 1 3 3 66.67% 0.00% 33.33% 0.00% 3
10:10 1/04/2016 2 3 5 5 40.00% 0.00% 60.00% 0.00% 5
10:20 1/04/2016 5 6 11 11 45.45% 0.00% 54.55% 0.00% 11
10:30 1/04/2016 2 3 5 5 40.00% 0.00% 60.00% 0.00% 5
10:40 1/04/2016 2 2 4 4 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 4
10:50 1/04/2016 6 7 13 13 46.15% 0.00% 53.85% 0.00% 13
11:00 1/04/2016 9 9 18 18 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 18
11:10 1/04/2016 8 8 16 16 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 16
11:20 1/04/2016 2 3 5 5 40.00% 0.00% 60.00% 0.00% 5
11:30 1/04/2016 2 2 4 4 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 4
11:40 1/04/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 2
11:50 1/04/2016 5 6 11 11 45.45% 0.00% 54.55% 0.00% 11
12:00 1/04/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 2
12:10 1/04/2016 2 2 4 4 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 4
12:20 1/04/2016 4 5 9 9 44.44% 0.00% 55.56% 0.00% 9
12:30 1/04/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 2
12:40 1/04/2016 3 3 6 6 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 6
12:50 1/04/2016 7 9 16 16 43.75% 0.00% 56.25% 0.00% 16
13:00 1/04/2016 3 3 6 6 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 6
13:10 1/04/2016 4 4 8 8 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 8
13:20 1/04/2016 7 11 18 18 38.89% 0.00% 61.11% 0.00% 18
13:30 1/04/2016 4 6 10 10 40.00% 0.00% 60.00% 0.00% 10
13:40 1/04/2016 5 6 11 11 45.45% 0.00% 54.55% 0.00% 11
13:50 1/04/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 2
14:00 1/04/2016 9 12 21 21 42.86% 0.00% 57.14% 0.00% 21
14:10 1/04/2016 4 5 9 9 44.44% 0.00% 55.56% 0.00% 9
14:20 1/04/2016 8 10 18 18 44.44% 0.00% 55.56% 0.00% 18
14:30 1/04/2016 3 4 7 7 42.86% 0.00% 57.14% 0.00% 7
14:40 1/04/2016 4 5 9 9 44.44% 0.00% 55.56% 0.00% 9
14:50 1/04/2016 2 3 4 9 9 22.22% 33.33% 44.44% 0.00% 9
15:00 1/04/2016 4 4 8 8 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 8
15:10 1/04/2016 3 5 8 8 37.50% 0.00% 62.50% 0.00% 8
15:20 1/04/2016 2 2 8 12 12 16.67% 16.67% 66.67% 0.00% 12
15:30 1/04/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
15:40 1/04/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
15:50 1/04/2016 4 4 8 8 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 8
16:00 1/04/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
16:10 1/04/2016 1 1 2 2 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 2
16:20 1/04/2016 2 4 6 6 0.00% 33.33% 66.67% 0.00% 6
16:30 1/04/2016 2 1 3 3 66.67% 0.00% 33.33% 0.00% 3
16:40 1/04/2016 2 2 5 9 9 22.22% 22.22% 55.56% 0.00% 9
16:50 1/04/2016 2 1 3 3 0.00% 66.67% 33.33% 0.00% 3
17:00 1/04/2016 4 4 4 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 4
17:10 1/04/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
17:30 1/04/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
17:50 1/04/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2
18:00 1/04/2016 2 2 2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 2
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Analysing the monthly data using an average for each month summarises the alarm systems 
performance as poor (Table 37). However, based on the maximum manageable alarm rate of 2 
alarms per 10 min. if the current monthly average alarms rates per 10 min. are divided between 
4 operators (3.78 operators calculated then rounded up) the facility would meet this 
performance standard. The text in Table 37 has been set to change to gauge the effect of 
drawing ones attention to values in excess of the standard. 
   
 
Table 37: Summarised 10min alarm average monthly analysis 
 
To better understand the alarm rate distribution per time interval, a histogram was used to 
visually display common trends in alarm rates for 10min periods. Fortunately, 77% of the alarm 
rates were within the 0-12 alarms / 10min interval spanning the 92 days (Table 38), therefore if 
the other 23% (high alarm rate periods) can be eliminated the system should remain mostly 
under the alarm flood performance metric.   
 
 
Figure 30: Histogram – Frequency distribution of alarm rates per 10 min. period over 92days 
High < 5%
Journal = 
N/A
Low < 80% Urgent < 1%
136 7.57675112 38.89% 8.22% 52.57% 0.31% 10.37%
144 6.5745583 25.94% 13.70% 60.08% 0.28% 5.51%
66 7.64476886 29.70% 11.86% 58.14% 0.31% 12.27%
MARCH MONTHLY AVERAGE 
APRIL MONTHLY AVERAGE 
ANALYSIS TO ISA 18.2 STANDARD
MONTHLY 10min ALARM AVERAGE ANALYSIS
Maximum 
Alarms 
/10min 
(=<10)
ALM ~1-2 / 
10min (Avg)
ALM > 10 / 
10min (~<1%)
Alarm Prioirty Distribution
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Table 38: Alarm rate per 10min period with alarm system percentage distribution  
 
In reviewing the contrast between in information provided in Tables 34, 35 and 36 and Figure 
31, displaying the alarm rates / performance a more traditional bar graph. The drawback in 
using the bar graph approach is the limited ability to draw ones attention the standards and the 
differences compared. Also when a high alarm rate period occurs the vertical scale changes, this 
may cause the observer to overlook the other time periods exceeding the performance metrics 
for 10min periods on account of the attention drawn to the three high rate alarm periods 
between 7:40am and 9:00am shown in Figure 32. 
 
NUMBER OF 
ALARMS / 
10mins
FREQUENCY 
% 
distribution / 
BIN
Accumulated 
total
0 0 0.00% 0.00%
2 1710 38.32% 38.32%
4 633 14.19% 52.51%
6 451 10.11% 62.62%
8 331 7.42% 70.04%
10 309 6.93% 76.96%
12 240 5.38% 82.34%
14 227 5.09% 87.43%
16 199 4.46% 91.89%
18 135 3.03% 94.91%
20 78 1.75% 96.66%
30 94 2.11% 98.77%
40 17 0.38% 99.15%
50 7 0.16% 99.31%
75 7 0.16% 99.46%
100 5 0.11% 99.57%
150 19 0.43% 100.00%
200 0 0.00% 100.00%
More 0 0.00% 100.00%
Sample count 4462
ALARM DISTRIBUTION PER 10 min PERIOD FOR 
92 DAYS
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Figure 31: Daily alarm count graph in 10min periods  
 
 
Figure 32: Daily alarm count graph in 10min periods  
 
In summary, the monthly, daily, hourly and 10min analysis provides an effective evaluation and 
variations of alarm data when assessing the performance of an alarm system. This variation 
prompts further investigation by the analyser, where in non-conformance problem are 
identified, however the monthly, daily, hourly and 10min period should be analysed based on 
the problem found with averaging.   
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5.6 Stale alarms 
 
Stale alarms are described as an alarm that remains in the alarm state for an extended period of 
time (e.g. 12, 24 hours). Stale alarms performance target is < 5 per day, should this be exceeded 
action plans to address these alarms should be in place. The analysis was shortened to >12 
hours based on most operator panels spanning a12 hour shift. Analysing this metric also showed 
some concerning trends by way of the included examples of prolonged periods where high and 
urgent alarms remaining in alarm (see Figure 33 and Table 39).  
 
The analysis per tag calculates time and days in alarm, some of these alarms occur twice or 
more during the 18th February to 8th March. This performance metric captures the backlog of 
active alarms in the system, analysis generally focuses on what’s entering the system, not the 
number of alarms remaining or missed in the system. 
 
Although the targets stale alarms < 5 alarms per day, this metric could include the number of 
days an alarm remains stale, escalating weight with each day the stale alarm remains. All alarms 
should be actioned, even if this includes, shelving, disabling the alarm under an out of service 
or management of change action until the alarm is required or returned to service.    
 
 
Figure 33: Stale alarms graph (High Priority) 
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Table 39: Stale alarms (High Priority) 
 
Analysis reveals 2 urgent priority alarms that remained stale (Figure 34) for over a week (Table 
40) demonstrating the need to assess the backlog of active alarms. 
 
Tag1 Time RTN
TIME ALM-
RTN High
14PI403 22/02/2016  3:30:40 PM 1 73:16:40 1
14PI403 2/03/2016  12:21:30 PM 1 27:51:00 1
14PI405 22/02/2016  5:23:31 PM 1 75:07:30 1
14PI405 2/03/2016  1:38:21 PM 1 29:04:20 1
14PI405 7/03/2016  5:39:41 AM 1 18:40:50 1
14PI407 23/02/2016  3:52:50 AM 1 85:37:10 1
14PI407 2/03/2016  1:46:10 PM 1 29:02:40 1
14PI407 3/03/2016  9:12:40 AM 1 12:52:30 1
14XA520D 19/02/2016  2:44:41 PM 1 18:29:17 1
14XA520D 22/02/2016  2:52:51 PM 1 72:08:03 1
14XA520D 25/02/2016  1:37:45 PM 1 70:17:59 1
14XA520D 3/03/2016  3:06:20 PM 1 166:11:00 1
14XA520D 4/03/2016  9:02:18 PM 1 29:55:50 1
14XAPMPA 29/02/2016  7:22:31 PM 1 263:08:40 1
3TCLSTA1 29/02/2016  7:46:09 PM 1 76:16:45 1
8XA2022 24/02/2016  7:14:54 PM 1 52:03:40 1
8XA2022 4/03/2016  8:35:29 PM 1 29:28:35 1
8XA2022 6/03/2016  9:02:44 AM 1 35:59:45 1
8XS2016B 29/02/2016  7:39:12 PM 1 263:08:16 1
9GEN1FUELPRESS 23/02/2016  7:57:46 AM 1 85:52:07 1
9GEN1FUELPRESS 3/03/2016  6:54:35 AM 1 214:56:10 1
9GEN2FUELPRESS 4/03/2016  8:19:52 AM 1 326:21:01 1
9GEN2FUELPRESS 5/03/2016  10:15:13 AM 1 25:54:59 1
9GEN2FUELPRESS 6/03/2016  5:03:50 PM 1 30:48:34 1
9LDI659 24/02/2016  2:41:53 AM 1 12:46:19 1
9LDI659 2/03/2016  1:20:58 AM 1 26:58:49 1
9LDI659 2/03/2016  9:49:25 PM 1 20:25:11 1
9LDI659 3/03/2016  11:45:49 AM 1 13:56:23 1
9LDI659 5/03/2016  11:39:53 AM 1 12:43:23 1
9LDI659 6/03/2016  3:05:31 AM 1 15:25:27 1
9LDI659 8/03/2016  5:26:23 AM 1 38:11:20 1
9XA114 28/02/2016  6:59:07 AM 1 37:21:29 1
9XA115 28/02/2016  7:23:26 AM 1 38:11:02 1
33ALM ACTIVE >12HRS
Stale Alarms - High Prioirty
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Figure 34: Stale alarms graph (Urgent Priority) 
 
 
Table 40: Stale alarms (Urgent Priority) 
 
The stale alarm results reflect various situations – 
 
1. The operator was overwhelmed with alarms causing the oversight and the alarms were 
buried with high influx of alarms 
2. The alarms are not important require an MOC and inclusion for the next alarm 
rationalisation workshop. 
3. The equipment is out of service or in standby mode therefore not actioned. (See item 4 
& 5) 
4. Operator re-training to help recognise, prioritise and address stale alarms  
5. Forgot to shelve the alarms  
6. Lack of support or backup for the operator by supervision or engineering monitoring 
and assessment. 
 
This performance metric if introduced to operations daily monitoring and reporting during a 
shift handover would ensure operators and supervising staff capture and address stale alarms. 
 
Tag1 Time RTN
TIME ALM-
RTN 
(HH:MM:SS)
Days High
14XILDS4 1/03/2016  5:11:40 PM 1 200:05:19 8:20 1
14XILDS4 8/03/2016  5:42:20 AM 1 18:00:10 0:45 1
9PI303 26/02/2016  3:48:33 PM 1 187:13:03 7:48 1
3
Stale Alarms - Urgent Prioirty
ALM ACTIVE >12HRS
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5.7 Shelved Alarms 
 
Shelving of alarms is a technique used to temporally suppress an alarm often used during 
periods of maintenance or high alarm rates to limit the distraction to the operator. Shelving of 
alarms should be accompanied with written permission in the form of an override certificate or 
MOC to acknowledge management’s approval to the change.  
Monitoring shelved alarms provides an overview of alarms that were suppressed using this 
method and will help determine if unauthorised alarm suppression has occurred. ISA 18.2 
targets zero alarms suppressed outside of controlled or approved methodology, the monitor 
would be required to check suppressed alarms against a register to confirm both override and 
shelved lists align.  
 
No review of suppression documentation or certificates was undertaken as these are generally 
company specific.   
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Table 41: Alarm Shelving Analysis  
 
Due to 9LDI659 high alarm frequency and suppression, interest in the behaviour of the operator 
and actions taken to manage this problem was investigated further. Although a slight side track, 
Figure 35 shows the time distribution pattern between alarms and their frequency. A cluster 
pattern of alarms start around the 5s and spans to 4 min. mark before tapering off until the 
15min. period. Although is information appears random, it could be possible a process or 
environmental effect is causing the sensor input alarm type “BADPV” to be a nuisance alarm.  
 
ALM SHELVED UNSHELVED Grand Total High Journal Low Urgent (blank)
9LDI659 1488 68 68 1624 1488 136
9LI659 1462 67 67 1596 1462 134
9XA662 703 2 2 707 703 4
9LI658 142 23 23 188 142 46
84HS601 120 3 3 126 120 6
82PIG048 86 86 86
82PIG056 77 77 77
82PIG064 73 73 73
9M354101 61 61 61
9LAL629 46 2 2 50 46 4
9PI319 40 40 40
14HS521 32 32 32
14HS520 22 22 22
9PI677 21 21 21
7PY1063 21 21 21
9PI676 21 21 21
9LI413 20 20 20
84HS600 20 20 20
9FI140 20 20 20
SWVAL 18 18 18
9PI301 17 17 17
MTPIGCNT 17 17 17
9HS624 17 17 17
09HS695 16 16 16
84IC2COM 15 15 15
84QA604 14 14 14
84MR601 12 12 12
9XI612 12 12 12
7FY1025 12 12 12
8XA2022 12 12 12
3TCLSTA1 11 11 11
09GD811_MOS 10 10 10
9XI611 10 10 10
8XS2016B 10 10 10
9FI653 9 9 9
9FI139 9 9 9
9PI303 9 9 9
09MOS_KEY_SWITCH 8 8 6 2
81QL605S 8 8 8
14PI405 8 8 8
85QL605 8 8 8
09FI111_10K_DCS 7 7 8
9XI108A 7 7 7
800J217H 7 7 7
9XI108B 7 7 7
84IC1ENT 7 7 7
84IC1PIR 7 7 7
8XI2023A 6 6 7
84QA601 6 1 1 8 6
84MR600 6 6 6
Alarms Suppression Priority DistributionTags
Alarms Sheleved and Unshelved
01-02-2016 to 17-02-2016
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Figure 35: 9LDI659 – Time between alarms 
 
However, the downside of the nuisance alarm is the distraction to the operator.  Based on the time 
patterns in Figure 36, there appears to be a time pattern to un-shelved alarms, the operators appear to 
have a tolerance of 30 min. before re-shelving. However, the shelved period range is less than expected 
with the majority time being 2 hours and 30minutes (Figure 37) indicating by frequency the alarms was a 
point of focus to the operators.  
 
 
Figure 36: 9LDI659 – Frequency of Time Periods Un-shelved 
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Figure 37: 9LDI659 – Frequency of Time Periods Shelved 
 
5.8 Advanced Analysis 
 
5.8.1 Time Analysis 
 
As per an alarm system specification each alarm or event is time stamped along with other 
information such as priority, alarm acknowledgement or returning to normal. ISA 18.2 and 
EEMUA 191 state the work rate (W) of an operator can be measured by the average alarm rate 
(R) multiplied by the average time to respond. Using these time stamps and attempt to complete 
time analysis to measure the alarm (ALM), acknowledge (ACK) and return to normal (RTN) 
time periods. 
 
Note –due to the amount of alarm data over the 92 days, the data was divided into smaller 
manageable files to limit excel crashing on account of being overloaded. 
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5.8.2 Analysing time between ALM – ACK 
 
First analysis tests the distribution of time from ALM-ACK using 1 min. intervals over 60 mins. 
The results in the figure above show 93% of alarms are acknowledged within first minute of 
activation (Figure 38 and Table 42).  
 
Figure 38: Time Analysis (ALM-ACK) (1 – 60 mins) 
 
Note – The alarm acknowledge pushbutton events range from 1-4 during some time stamps. 
This creates a difference between ALM and ACK by increasing the sum total of ACK. To 
simplify analysis all acknowledge events have been set to ACK =1, bring the ACK total = 5831. 
Considered explanations for the additional ACK numbers per time event included the ACK 
button being depressed for an extended duration of time either out of frustration with alarm 
frequency, sticky contact on button and or an electronic de-bounce problem. If 24hr monitoring 
and reporting was in place, the problem would have been identified and through conversation 
with operator resolved the issue. 
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Table 42: Time Analysis (ALM-ACK) (1min-60min) 
 
Considering 93% of the ALM-ACK events occur in less than 1min, the interval of 1s to 4 min. 
is employed to analyse the data. In this instant 86% of alarms are acknowledges within 5s. 
 
Errors occur for the times between 0:00:00 to 0:00:01 or 40% of the total ALM-ACK events 
(Figure 39 and Table 43). This error is due to splitting the data between spreadsheets due to the 
size of data files. Hence, the accumulated time between alarm and acknowledge does not carry 
over from the last alarm to acknowledge event where the accumulated time is recorded in the 
respective excel cell.   
 
 
Figure 39: Time Analysis (ALM-ACK) (1s-4min) 
 
TIME ALM-
ACK
OCCURANCE 
FREQUENCY
% ALM-ACK PER 
TIME PERIOD
ACCUMULATING 
%
0:01:00 5476 93.91% 93.91%
0:02:00 82 1.41% 95.32%
0:03:00 42 0.72% 96.04%
0:04:00 29 0.50% 96.54%
0:05:00 23 0.39% 96.93%
0:06:00 13 0.22% 97.15%
0:07:00 7 0.12% 97.27%
0:08:00 7 0.12% 97.39%
0:09:00 7 0.12% 97.51%
0:10:00 6 0.10% 97.62%
TIME ANALYSIS ALM-ACK (1st - 17th Feb 2016)
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Table 43: Time Analysis (ALM-ACK) (1s-4min) 
 
Utilising the percentage time period against the total time for which the alarm data was taken an 
estimate of the work rate (W) can be calculated. If the maximum manageable alarm rate per 
person is 2 alarms/ 10min. or Work Rate = 2 per 10 min.      
 
Given the average alarm rate for February is 7.56 alarms per 10 min. multiplying this by the 
ALM-ACK timeframes spread over a 17day period equates to a work rate of 3.9358 per 10 min 
for February. This equates to a work rate of 1.97 times the advised manageable work rate for 
February. The work rate calculation could be used to predict operator alarm workloads, thus 
assist in determining the number of panel operators required to safety distribute the work load 
to maintain a safe and manageable work rate. 
 
Caution should be used or a correction factor added given the possibly of additional ACK 
events being logged per time event due to sticky contacts in a keypad which would produce an 
error. 
  
TIME ALM-
ACK
OCCURANCE 
FREQUENCY
% ALM-ACK 
PER TIME 
PERIOD
ACCUMULATI
NG %
0:00:01 2322 39.82% 39.82%
0:00:02 1842 31.59% 71.41%
0:00:03 254 4.36% 75.77%
0:00:04 367 6.29% 82.06%
0:00:05 235 4.03% 86.09%
0:00:06 24 0.41% 86.50%
0:00:07 36 0.62% 87.12%
0:00:08 43 0.74% 87.86%
0:00:09 16 0.27% 88.13%
0:00:10 37 0.63% 88.77%
0:00:11 12 0.21% 88.97%
0:00:12 30 0.51% 89.49%
0:00:13 23 0.39% 89.88%
0:00:14 7 0.12% 90.00%
0:00:15 24 0.41% 90.41%
0:00:16 23 0.39% 90.81%
0:00:17 3 0.05% 90.86%
0:00:18 17 0.29% 91.15%
0:00:19 2 0.03% 91.19%
0:00:20 13 0.22% 91.41%
… … … …
… … … …
… … … …
0:03:59 0 0.00% 0.00%
0:04:00 0 0.00% 0.00%
More 202 3.46% 3.46%
TIME ANALYSIS ALM-ACK (1st - 17th Feb 2016)
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5.8.3 Analysing time between ALM – RTN 
 
Having determined the ALM-ACK time, it seemed worthwhile analysing the time between 
alarm (ALM) annunciation and variable returning to normal (RTN). This measure being 
considered a measure of the effectiveness of control system and the operator’s combined 
response. Analysis shown in Figure 40 and equated in Table 44 for the duration of the 1st to the 
17th February 2016, determined 71% of the 4943 alarms returned to normal within 1 min. of 
activation and 91% in the first 10 min. This could suggest the control system is considered 
effective, slightly sluggish due to aged or process conditions have changed therefore requiring a 
further review based only on this statistical analysis.    
 
 
Figure 40: ALM-RTN Histogram (1min - 60min) 
 
113 
 
  
Table 44: ALM-RTN Analysis (1min – 60min) 
 
Further analysis into the distribution of ALM-RTN time periods shows 30% of the total alarms 
annunciate and return to normal within a 5s period (Figure 41 and Table 45). It would be fair to 
assume this return to normal is faster than a panel operator can respond.   
 
 
TIME ALM-
RTN
OCCURANCE 
FREQUENCY
% ALM-RTN 
PER TIME 
PERIOD
ACCUMULATI
NG %
0:01:00 3523 71.2725066 71.2725066
0:02:00 571 11.5516893 82.8241958
0:03:00 163 3.29759256 86.1217884
0:04:00 118 2.38721424 88.5090026
0:05:00 35 0.70807202 89.2170747
0:06:00 49 0.99130083 90.2083755
0:07:00 24 0.4855351 90.6939106
0:08:00 21 0.42484321 91.1187538
0:09:00 14 0.28322881 91.4019826
0:10:00 17 0.3439207 91.7459033
0:11:00 14 0.28322881 92.0291321
0:12:00 9 0.18207566 92.2112078
0:13:00 6 0.12138378 92.3325915
0:14:00 16 0.32369007 92.6562816
0:15:00 10 0.20230629 92.8585879
0:16:00 3 0.06069189 92.9192798
0:17:00 5 0.10115315 93.0204329
0:18:00 5 0.10115315 93.1215861
0:19:00 1 0.02023063 93.1418167
0:20:00 7 0.1416144 93.2834311
… … … …
… … … …
… … … …
1:00:00 1 0.02023063 94.6995752
More 233 4.7137366 99.4133118
TIME ANALYSIS ALM-RTN (1st - 17th Feb 2016)
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Figure 41: ALM-RTN Histogram (1s - 4min) 
 
Table 45 quantifies the individual and accumulated extent of time between alarm and the alarm 
returning to its normal state.  
 
Filtering the time period and grouping each tag quantifies the alarms affected. Based on the 0 - 
5 s time period, 145 separate alarms could potentially be affected if some form of suppression 
was applied to the identified alarms. The major benefit is the potential 30% reduction in alarms.    
 
The improvements increase as an accumulating percentage in Table 45. Highlighted shows the 
10 seconds after alarm annunciates 39% of alarms have occurred.  
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Table 45: ALM-RTN Analysis (1s - 4min) 
 
TIME ALM-
RTN
OCCURANCE 
FREQUENCY
% ALM-RTN PER 
TIME PERIOD
ACCUMULATING 
%
0:00:01 310 6.27% 6.27%
0:00:02 322 6.51% 12.79%
0:00:03 84 1.70% 14.49%
0:00:04 398 8.05% 22.54%
0:00:05 382 7.73% 30.27%
0:00:06 66 1.34% 31.60%
0:00:07 143 2.89% 34.49%
0:00:08 122 2.47% 36.96%
0:00:09 39 0.79% 37.75%
0:00:10 100 2.02% 39.77%
0:00:11 34 0.69% 40.46%
0:00:12 129 2.61% 43.07%
0:00:13 103 2.08% 45.15%
0:00:14 25 0.51% 45.66%
0:00:15 89 1.80% 47.46%
0:00:16 71 1.44% 48.90%
0:00:17 30 0.61% 49.50%
0:00:18 65 1.31% 50.82%
0:00:19 23 0.47% 51.28%
0:00:20 80 1.62% 52.90%
0:00:21 69 1.40% 54.30%
0:00:22 28 0.57% 54.87%
0:00:23 80 1.62% 56.48%
0:00:24 61 1.23% 57.72%
0:00:25 15 0.30% 58.02%
0:00:26 48 0.97% 58.99%
0:00:27 8 0.16% 59.15%
0:00:28 45 0.91% 60.06%
0:00:29 26 0.53% 60.59%
0:00:30 9 0.18% 60.77%
… … … …
… … … …
… … … …
0:04:00 4 0.08% 88.51%
More 539 10.90% 99.41%
TIME ANALYSIS ALM-RTN (1st - 17th Feb 2016)
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Figure 42: Time filter (0-5s) 
 
 
Table 46: Top 20 – ALM-RTN tags within (0-5s) 
Item TAGS ALM-RTN 
COUNT
1 9LDI659 1488
2 9LI659 1462
3 9XA662 703
4 9LI658 142
5 84HS601 114
6 82PIG048 86
7 82PIG056 77
8 82PIG064 73
9 9M354101 61
10 9LAL629 46
11 9PI319 40
12 14HS521 32
13 14HS520 22
14 9LI413 20
15 84HS600 19
16 9FI140 18
17 9PI301 17
18 84IC2COM 15
19 84QA604 14
20 84MR601 12
145
TOP 20 - ALM-RTN (0-5s)                           
1st to 17th Feb 2016
Total TAGS
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Based on the potential improvement provided by a suppression time delay of 0-5s, the alarm 
data was rearranged into monthly groups to quantify the improvement per month. 
 
Table 47 calculates for the month of February an improvement of 5% or 10 less tags will alarm 
and return to normal (ALM-RTN) in comparison to the original ALM-RTN data.  
 
The difference for February between annunciated alarms (ALM) and original ALM-RTN is 
4.16%. Where the initial projected improvement of 30% in Table 45 is over 17 days a more 
realistic 26% for February remains a realistic improvement as per Table 47 February results. 
 
  
 
Table 47: Suppression (5s) Monthly Improvement  
 
Quantifying the alarm tags affected by the 5s delay is included as an example. A total of 58 tags 
will improve by alarming less and 51 alarms improve more than 10%. Interestingly, the spread 
of improvement is across 30% of the alarm tags.   
No. 
ALARMS
No. ALM-
RTN
No. ALM-RTN 
TAGS
∆ % ALM-
RTN
∆ No. 
ALM-RTN
No. RTNs 
∆ % AS 
FOUND to 
DELAY
∆ ALM-
RTN
∆ 
No.TAGS
∆ % TAGS
∆ No. 
TAGS
-10
-14
-17
5.29%
5.83%
6.51%
-2508
-3495
-1677
179
226
24412051 261 13.92%
35.98%
26.04%4.16%
-2.49%
3.10%
-418
236
-385
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
7125
6219
10374
189
240
963310051
9478
12436
9714
MONTHLY IMPROVEMENT WITH 5s DELAY TO IDENTIFIED TAGS
MONTH
FORECAST IMPROVEMENT - 5s DELAY TO SELECTED TAGSAS FOUND
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Table 48: 5s Delay tag improvement for February 
 
Other suppression strategies could include applying different time delays to different priorities 
alarms. For example high priority alarm that ALM-RTN with a 0-5s timeframe is suppress 
whereas low priority ALM-RTN could be extended to 0-10s. All these suppression strategies 
require undergoing an alarm rationalisation workshop and MOC approval before being 
implemented. Importantly, where alarm delays are used, the alarm should be captured in the 
events journal on first triggered. Capturing this trigger event ensures the sequence of events log 
is accurate regardless of when the alarm annunciates to the operator and aids any other analysis 
or reviews.   
 
5.8.4 Correlation  
 
The following example analysis demonstrates the used of correlation analysis technique. 
Correlation coefficient (a value between -1 and +1) identifies how strongly two variables are 
related to each other. Auto and cross-correlation are statistical techniques for analysing time 
varying signals to identify underlying patterns that may be hidden in noise.  
 
Microsoft excel has a CORREL function or activating the Analysis Tool Pak add-in will help 
find the correlation coefficient between two variables. The correlation coefficient of +1 
TAGs Sum of RTN
TAG % 
IMPROVEMENT
9LI659 1615 20.21%
9LDI659 1587 20.17%
9LI658 295 13.49%
SWVAL 156 31.58%
83HS600 126 16.00%
84HS601 40 4.76%
14HS521 39 7.14%
14HS520 37 11.90%
84HS600 26 7.14%
84IC2PIR 26 3.70%
7FY1025 18 10.00%
9XA687 14 17.65%
81QL605S 13 7.14%
84MR600 12 14.29%
84MR601 12 14.29%
9XA662 11 99.53%
9FI111 11 8.33%
9FY116 11 8.33%
14PI403 10 16.67%
14PI405 10 16.67%
14PI407 9 18.18%
MT_ACCUM 6 40.00%
9UA623 6 33.33%
84IC2ENT 6 14.29%
84IC2SOL 6 14.29%
FEBRUARY 5s DELAY IMPROVEMENT PER TAG
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indicates a perfect positive correlation where variables X and Y increase or decrease together. A 
correlation coefficient of -1 indicates a perfect negative correlation where variable X increases, 
variable Z decreases or variable X decreases and variable Z increases. A correlation coefficient 
tending towards 0 indicates no correlation hence correlation values of < 0.5 will be considered 
unrelated.  
 
Errors where experienced using this technique. Firstly, noise from the top 4 bad actors masked 
alarms correlating to each other, hence were removed for correlation. Second time stamping to 
seconds prevented relationships being discovered, therefore the alarms where grouped into 
minimum time intervals of 10 min. 
 
Using correlation analysis appears effective in identifying relationships however requires time 
to further investigate the relationship based on their variables to determine if such a relationship 
truly exists. Using the instruments variable sensor data as opposed to alarms will confirm 
relationships i.e. high flow from an upstream transmitter cause a pressure or level transmitter 
downstream to activate.  
   
 
Figure 43: Correlation analysis of data (10 min. interval) 
 
Shown below is a negative relationship where 9GEN1FUELPRESS and 82PIG048 have a 
negative opposing relationship. The two transmitters are completely separate and hence their 
relationship is disregarded. 
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Figure 44: Correlation analysis related however physically unrelated variable (10 min. interval) 
 
 
5.9 Errors and Assumptions 
 
Considered errors during analysis include alarm event calculations that do not carryover 
between data files. Due to the size of the alarm data, separate files were created into smaller 
data blocks to prevent the PC from crashing. The considered error occurs when an alarm occurs 
but does not return to normal within the data file, hence the calculated value remains 
uncalculated. For the sake of this thesis this error was considered minor in terms of affecting the 
outcome of the analysis based on the strong trends and results. In the case where a PC having 
access to the alarm systems database, a customised vendor supplied alarm system analysis 
software package also connected to the alarm database, greater filtering or continuity in alarms 
and events or results over time periods is made easier and reduces such errors.   
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Assumptions based the analysis performance results; these may portray a poor alarm system 
state even though the alarm system, plant and operators are content with the alarms systems. 
This assumption can only be confirmed through a perception survey (Appendix F). A survey is 
generally conducted on a needs basis or a frequency deemed suitable.  
 
The periods of high alarm rates, an alarm placed into a shelved state will not annunciate to the 
operator. However, the alarms are recorded in the alarms and events log, therefore any shelved 
alarms were not be excluded in the analysis as they were considered relevant in determining the 
alarm systems performance and alarms requiring scrutiny.  
 
Averaging results can mask poor performances or high alarm rates occurring in short time 
periods. Where required, averaging flaws were identified to caution users when monitoring and 
assessing performance standards. 
 
5.10 Analysis Summary 
 
Applying all performance metrics and advanced analysis methods to the surveyed alarm data, 
the results demonstrate the need for companies to constantly monitor and assess their alarm 
systems. The high frequency alarms, bad actors or nuisance alarms can be considered as noise 
and hence corrupt the analysis. Standards and Guidelines suggest removing these alarms for 
analysis; however on removing 7 bad actors in the alarm data another 20 surfaced exceeding the 
performance metric. Predicting changes before implementation is vital as improvements may be 
masked by other degraded measurements which appeared fine in its original condition. 
 
Analysing time between ALM-ACK proved an operator work rate can be calculated, errors 
considered. Exploring the time between ALM-RTN proved to be a beneficial measure of 
performance. Capturing ALM-RTN times allows analysis of the control system or an operator’s 
physical ability to respond based on clearance times. All alarms must have a purpose and a 
response according to the standards, therefore alarms that fall into considered time limits can 
then be scrutinised and managed. In cases this may include, re-tuning, supressing based on 
priority however in all cases any change shall be executed as part of an MOC and undergo 
alarm rationalisation workshop to review and approve the change.       
 
The software package analysis methods developed in Microsoft Excel (Appendix B) and 
analysis examples provided this section produce all the necessary results that can be tailored to 
monitor, assess and report alarm systems conditions to successfully support justification for 
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change or resources. Or as the case may be develop evidence to present to an alarm 
rationalisation workshop to facilitate targeted outcomes as opposed to a generalised review 
approach. 
 
The various graphical representations used to present the analysis results has hopefully inspired 
new ideas for those considering new ways to present information.  
 
The work has hopefully demonstrated and/or provided examples of the needs and benefits of 
performance metrics that companies can adopt or implement to ensure their systems are 
operating as per the specified standards.   
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6.0 Conclusion  
 
Alarms attract attention and present information in many different ways for example audible 
sounds, visual indications (flashing lights and text), background or text colour changes, graphic 
or pictorial changes and messages. Modern technology has evolved in complexity, allowing 
many different types of alarms to be easily configured within a control system to monitor and 
on activation, alert operators or engineers of the alarm state. It is the ease of implementing an 
alarm, the relative low cost and sheer number of various alarms a control system offer, can 
cause an information overload where simultaneous alarms occur in a short space of time 
commonly referred to as an alarm flood.       
 
Based on the evidence presented in this report, an alarm system operating within its manageable 
performance limits creates a safe operational envelope and layer of protection between variable 
and hazardous state. Allowing suitable amount of response time for the operator to return the 
alarm back to its normal (alarm cleared) state is crucial as the response time help the operator 
diagnose the alarm condition, implement the response and monitor. These actions prevent the 
escalation of a hazardous situation; however they also help prevent losses in profit due to 
unplanned shutdowns, equipment damage or off specification product. Efficient operation also 
reduces wear to equipment machinery from stress caused to equipment when safety protection 
devices operate returning the monitored process variable back to within safe operating range. 
 
Industrial incidents account for US$10- 20 billion dollars per year in losses (EEMUA, 2013). In 
many cases incident investigations associated process control system alarm floods or badly 
designed or performing alarms systems as a contributing causal factor to an incident event. This 
is often due to alarms floods overwhelming the operator preventing them from diagnosing and 
responding efficiently to contain or prevent the abnormal situation escalation. However the rate 
or the way in which alarms are presented may not always be the contributing cause. Human 
factors contribute another variable in an alarm systems functional design, having various effects 
on an operator’s ability to perform. Human performance shaping factors (PSF) can be 
influenced both externally and internally to the workplace. It is important operators present fit-
for-work or advise their supervisors or managers of any factors affecting their ability to 
perform. Equally it is important for the supervisors and or managers to support  and foster open 
communication, as this is often the only means in determining ones state of mind and is 
particularly relevant when operating highly hazardous facilities such as nuclear, chemical, 
pesticide or hydrocarbons to name a few.  
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Alarm management standards and guidelines are very well defined documents that, in cases like 
EEMUA 191, read like book. EEMUA 191 provides examples and information necessary to 
purchase, develop and maintain an effective alarm management system. ISA 18.2 and IEC-
62682 specify the lifecycle aspects of an alarms system, as well as providing benchmark 
performance standards. The standards also specify the functionality of a control system 
providing manufactures the necessary information to develop technology to enable operators, 
maintenance personnel and engineers the ability within their alarm system to monitor various 
alarm states, types, priority and conditions. This enables specified or specific areas of interest or 
concern to trigger an alarm, bringing attention to a perceived or known problem or hazard. The 
alignment of standards and guidelines by the companies alarm management system surveyed, 
demonstrated the effectiveness of the standards and guidelines to deliver a consistent message, 
however more importantly the willingness of these companies to seek and implement 
considered best practice alarm management standards and guidelines. In all cases the surveyed 
companies had attempted more stringent performance levels than the standards and reporting       
 
Reviewing the surveyed companies alarm standards, procedures and alarm data, identified 
opportunities to improve monitoring and assessment. Suggested changes include changing the 
KPI reporting format to ensure all aspects of the performance standards are monitored for the 
specified time periods 10 min. 1 hour, 12 hour (operator shift), 24 hour and monthly. 
Completing performance comparisons against all performance variables will identify any 
specific areas of interest that exceed the performance limits and can be presented in an 
overview report to other targeted audiences depending on their needs and technical 
understanding.  
 
Benefits of multiple performance standards comparisons having analysed the alarm data 
highlighted other areas for improvement. The data showed overuse of the high priority alarm, 
often 5 to 6 times the specified target (< 5 %).  Another area of improvement was operator work 
rate; the calculated work rate for 17 days in February was 1.9 times higher than the maximum 
manageable work rate. This suggests an opportunity review the alarms between current 
operators, employ another operator, reduce alarm rates or shut down the process and repair the 
problems. The elevation shutdown decision KPI was specified in company ‘A’ alarm 
management procedure. This approach provides guidelines for staff to follow based on an 
elevated KPI value (Tables 13 and 14).  
 
Interestingly EEMUA 191 places the top 10 load percentage as secondary KPI. Analysis 
demonstrated high alarm rates seen as noise corrupt the alarm analysis results. And is effective 
in targeting alarms who’s load contributes more an >1% of the total alarm load.  
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Human factors in relation to the time between alarm and acknowledge (ALM-ACK) as shown 
in Figure 40 where most of the alarms are acknowledged within a few seconds, improving the 
alarm system should see more acknowledge events distributed across the time axis 
demonstrating operator confidence and less alarm load. Generally low priority 
acknowledgement timelines will be greater than high priority, aligning to an alarm priority 
matrix response time criteria. Importantly short acknowledge times with no obvious operator 
response may be an indication that the operator is finding that many alarms are of little 
operational value in the present process state or is accepting them without significant 
investigation. 
 
In analysing the time between alarm and the alarm returning-to-normal (ALM-RTN) (not a 
standard or company specified performance metric), the analysis identified a considerable 
number of ALM-RTN events within a short period (Table 47 or Figure 41). Returning to the 
first principles of an alarm, every alarm requires a response (ISA 18.2, 2009). Hence, there is 
little chance of an operator reviewing and responding an alarm that will clear within short time 
period i.e. 5 seconds.  This raises the question could these short duration alarms be suppressed. 
Implementing for example, 5 second suppression for only the identified ALM-RTN alarms 
would reduce the annunciation of the total alarm count by 26%.  While allowing alarms to 
annunciate after 5 seconds providing they are still active. This type of approach could include 
time based suppression based on alarm priority and periods i.e. 10s suppression for low priority 
alarms and 5s for high priority alarms. The measure also captures the control system, by 
identifying alarms that potentially require tuning or maintenance or flagging process changes 
where engineering design review may be warranted i.e. resizing a valve or change the heating 
capacity of a heat exchange.  
 
Where resources and technology permit, implementing an automated report for the end of each 
operator’s shift (12 hours) outlining key performance metrics would engage conversations, 
familiarity and focus on the alarm system. Importantly, stale or shelved alarms could be 
recognised and handed over to the incoming shift for action for follow up.  
 
As demonstrated by the outcomes identified for Company B, the standards and guidelines 
provide industry with the necessary information to effectively implement and manage a safe, 
reliable and efficient alarm system. The research evidence supports organisations allocating 
resources to reduce and maintain alarm rates to within the performance matric limits specified, 
which in the long term, provide greater profit returns and a safer operation.   
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Appendix A – ENG4111/4112 Research Project 
Specification 
 
For :  Ross Guy 
Title :  Best practice management of industrial process control alarm floods 
Major :  BENG – Instrumentation and Control Engineering 
Supervisors :  
Mrs Catherine Hills, (tentative TBA – Employer engineering team are 
interested in supporting and or providing guidance towards the research 
topic) 
Sponsorship :  Employer is interested in assisting to what capacity is TBA. 
Confidentiality:   
Possible masking of data, titles, terms or references may be required where 
company information is used. 
Enrolment :  BENG – Instrumentation and Control Engineering 
Project Aim :  
Investigate causes of industrial process control alarm floods and 
recommend approaches to preventing and managing these events.   
   
Programme :  Issue label ‘B’ – 30th March 2016 
   
1. 
 
Research alarm flood background information within the context of 
process control systems. 
2. 
 
Study the underlying attributes and purpose of an alarm, including human 
factors impacting the alarm management system. 
3. 
 
Investigate current company employed control system technology, alarm 
philosophy, alarm flood management techniques and alarm flood control 
methodology.  
4. 
 
Make recommendations for best practices in managing alarm floods in real 
time under all operating conditions. 
As time permits: 
5. 
 
Develop, model and or design improved methods to manage alarm floods 
in association with EEMUA Publication 191, ISA 18.2 and other identified 
resources. 
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Appendix B – Analysis Tool Methods 
 
Microsoft Excel – Alarm Data Methods  
 
The Microsoft Excel data analysis methods described below outline some of the methods used 
to help analyse the alarm data.  
 
Tidy the alarm data removing all blanks columns and rows. Ensure the text formatting sizes 
column width are the same. 
 
EEMUA 191 and ISA 18.2 require alarms analysed in 1 hour and 10 min. periods. This can be 
achieved in two ways. Create reference tables for the time periods show below in figures 45 and 
46. In first column enter the minimum time and in the second column titled range enter the code 
to create a text cell for the range of time the VLOOKUP will display with the said worksheet. 
 
 
Figure 45: Excel time 10min periods 
 
 
Figure 46: Excel time 1 hour periods 
 
It is also important to name the table and worksheet for inter-spreadsheet referencing Figure 47.  
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Figure 47: Excel Worksheet reference 
 
Other option is to use a FLOOR function; both FLOOR and VLOOKUP have been used in the 
data analysis. Group each time stamped alarm into 10 min. and 1 hour periods. Create four 
columns FLOOR and VLOOKUP for 10 min. and 1 hour time groups. Each columns cell code 
is shown in function tab for reference. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48: Excel filters for 10 min and 1 hour periods  
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An easy way to manipulate data is to create a Pivot Table by selecting the alarm data of interest 
within the worksheet. Once created select PivotTable field list items of interest and drag them to 
the field areas below. Note – use caution as large amount of data take time to process.  
 
The user can then filter fields based in interest or add combinations to obtain data layouts for 
further analysis on another worksheet. Figure 49 is an example of a PivotTable using the 
FLOOR10min data set showing all the alarms within each 10min. period for the time period 
analysed. 
 
 
Figure 49: Excel pivot table data analysis and filtering  
 
In Figure 50, the PivotTable has merged row cells together linking the next columns to the first 
column. To separate the merged cells data to individual cells for further processing in a separate 
worksheet, a Visual Basic Application (VBA) module script was used (see figure 50 and 51) to 
create a worksheet function. The function when typed into a cell =GetMergedValue() reads the 
assigned merged cell data and displays it in its residing cell (see figure XX below). 
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Figure 50: Excel pivot table data analysis and filtering 
  
  
Figure 51: Excel VBA script to get merged cell values 
 
Figure 52: Excel VBA script cell function to get merged cell values 
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Step 5 - Another problem encountered was tallying merged cells to quantify a number of alarm 
tags with separate alarm events. Using another VBA script (see figure 53) to create a worksheet 
function “=CountMerged()” when entered into a cell counts the merged cells within a set range.     
 
  
Figure 53: Excel VBA script to count merged cells 
 
  
Figure 54: Excel VBA script cell function to count a range of merged cells 
 
Step 6 – Time analysis. Method used was to group the tags, accumulate time and read 
accumulated time based on flags (ALM, ACK, and RTN). Using the IF() function and 
combinations of AND() and OR() functions within the IF() function.  Figure 55 shows the 
various cells 
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Figure 55: Excel condition based time calculation   
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Appendix C – Results % CONTRIBUTION  
 
Figure 56: February alarm load % contribution 
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Table 49: February alarm load % contribution 
 
Figure 57: March alarm load % contribution 
TOP 20 TAG ALARM 
COUNT
% CONTRIBUTION TO 
TOTAL ALARM LOAD
ACCCUMULATED % 
ALARM LOAD
1 9LDI659 3488 34.70% 34.70%
2 9LI659 3432 34.14% 68.84%
3 9XA662 703 6.99% 75.84%
4 9LI658 481 4.79% 80.62%
5 82PIG048 128 1.27% 81.89%
6 84HS601 126 1.25% 83.15%
7 82PIG056 113 1.12% 84.27%
8 82PIG064 108 1.07% 85.35%
9 9M354101 62 0.62% 85.96%
10 9PI319 51 0.51% 86.47%
11 14HS521 48 0.48% 86.95%
12 9LAL629 47 0.47% 87.42%
13 14HS520 43 0.43% 87.84%
14 SWVAL 37 0.37% 88.21%
15 9PI677 36 0.36% 88.57%
16 9PI676 36 0.36% 88.93%
17 9PI301 31 0.31% 89.24%
18 7PY1063 31 0.31% 89.54%
19 84IC1PIR 30 0.30% 89.84%
20 84QA604 29 0.29% 90.13%
… … … … …
… … … … …
210 9XA1000 1 0.01% 99.97%
211 09UV803_OVR 1 0.01% 99.98%
212 09UV803_DO 1 0.01% 99.99%
10051
FEBRUARY 2016 - TOP 20 MOST FREQUENT ALARMS
Grand Total
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Table 50: March alarm load % contribution 
 
 
Figure 58: April alarm load % contribution 
TOP 20 TAG ALARM 
COUNT
% CONTRIBUTION TO 
TOTAL ALARM LOAD
ACCCUMULATED % 
ALARM LOAD
1 9XA662 2337 24.66% 24.66%
2 9LI659 1891 19.95% 44.61%
3 9LDI659 1855 19.57% 64.18%
4 9LI658 330 3.48% 67.66%
5 SWVAL 227 2.40% 70.06%
6 300J220 194 2.05% 72.10%
7 800J220 180 1.90% 74.00%
8 83HS600 146 1.54% 75.54%
9 82PIG048 127 1.34% 76.88%
10 800J218 123 1.30% 78.18%
11 GOBE_ESD 123 1.30% 79.48%
12 82PIG056 120 1.27% 80.74%
13 82PIG064 117 1.23% 81.98%
14 300JTCL 95 1.00% 82.98%
15 800J219 58 0.61% 83.59%
16 14PDH525 46 0.49% 84.08%
17 14HS520 40 0.42% 84.50%
18 9PI676 39 0.41% 84.91%
19 9PI677 39 0.41% 85.32%
20 84HS601 38 0.40% 85.72%
… … … … …
… … … … …
259 09UV804_OVR 1 0.01% 99.98%
260 85QA605D 1 0.01% 99.99%
261 14XA520 1 0.01% 100.00%
10051
MARCH 2016 - TOP 20 MOST FREQUENT ALARMS
Grand Total
138 
 
 
Table 51: April alarm load % contribution 
 
 
  
TOP 20 TAG ALARM 
COUNT
% CONTRIBUTION TO 
TOTAL ALARM LOAD
ACCCUMULATED % 
ALARM LOAD
1 9LDI659 3313 26.64% 26.64%
2 9LI659 3286 26.42% 53.06%
3 9LI658 2311 18.58% 71.65%
4 81PDH301S 173 1.39% 73.04%
5 GOBE_ESD 157 1.26% 74.30%
6 800J218 156 1.25% 75.55%
7 81FUELLOS 116 0.93% 76.49%
8 KI_PRES 106 0.85% 77.34%
9 9FI140 92 0.74% 78.08%
10 KO_PRES 92 0.74% 78.82%
11 300JTCL 86 0.69% 79.51%
12 $CONSOLE01 77 0.62% 80.13%
13 82PIG048 76 0.61% 80.74%
14 14PDH525 75 0.60% 81.34%
15 82PIG056 70 0.56% 81.91%
16 82PIG064 68 0.55% 82.45%
17 9XA687 62 0.50% 82.95%
18 81HS602S 58 0.47% 83.42%
19 MU_PRES 49 0.39% 83.81%
20 81EI602AS 42 0.34% 84.15%
… … … … …
… … … … …
300 83FUELLO 1 0.01% 99.98%
301 09GD801_OVR 1 0.01% 99.99%
302 44M41523 1 0.01% 100.00%
12436
APRIL 2016 - TOP 20 MOST FREQUENT ALARMS
Grand Total
139 
 
APPENDIX D – Project Planner / Timeline  
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APPENDIX E – Project Risk assessment 
 
This risk assessment considers foreseeable risks associated with researching the “Best practice 
management of industrial process control alarm floods”, during and post report submission. 
Where new risks are identified during the project research, these risks shall be captured and 
entered into this live risk assessment document as well as current risk monitored and reviewed 
during the course of the project. 
The method follows Australian / New Zealand Standards 4360:1999 Risk Management. This 
method has been selected based on the country the study originates.  
Risk assessment overview 
 
The research into alarm floods considers how best to analyse alarm data without jeopardising 
the safe operation of an industrial processing plant by suppressing alarms communicating 
dangerous situations that could potentially cause harm. 
Based on the risk matrix below the following other classification of risk is utilised as a subset to 
the risk assessment to further specify a considered risk or hazard rationale associated with the 
description, taken from Australian Standards 1999. 
a) Diseases—affecting humans, animals and plants. 
b) Economic perils—e.g. currency fluctuations, interest rates, share market. 
c) Environnemental—e.g. noise, contamination, pollution. 
d) Financial—e.g. contractual risks, misappropriation of funds, fraud, fines. 
e) Human perils—e.g. explosions, riots, strikes, sabotage. 
f) Natural perils—e.g. climatic conditions, earthquakes, bushfires, vermin, and volcanic 
activity. 
g) Occupational health and safety—e.g. inadequate safety measures, poor safety 
management. 
h) Product liability —e.g. design error, substandard quality control, inadequate testing. 
i) Professional liability —e.g. wrong advice, negligence, design error. 
j) Property damage—e.g. fire, water damage, earthquakes, contamination, human error. 
k) Public liability—e.g. public access, egress and safety. 
l) Security —e.g. cash arrangements, vandalism, theft, misappropriation of information, 
illegal entry. 
m) Technology—e.g. obsolescence, advances and failure. 
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Risk Matrix 
 
The following tables (Tables 52, 53 & 54) are used to create a level number that has been 
transferred to the risk matrix in order to risk rank the identified risks or hazards associated with 
the project. 
 
Qualitative measures of likelihood 
Level Descriptor Description 
5 Almost certain The event is expected to occur in most circumstances 
4 Likely The event will probably occur in most circumstances 
3 Moderate The event should occur at some time 
2 Unlikely The event could occur at some time 
1 Rare The event may occur only in exceptional circumstances 
Table 52- Qualitative measures of risk likelihood 
 
Qualitative measures of consequence or impact 
Level Descriptor Description 
5 Insignificant No injuries, low financial loss 
4 Minor First aid treatment, on-site release immediately contained, 
medium financial loss 
3 Moderate Medical treatment required, on-site release contained with 
outside assistance, high 
financial loss 
2 Major Extensive injuries, loss of production capability, off-site 
release with no detrimental effects, major financial loss 
1 Catastrophic Death, toxic release off-site with detrimental effect, huge 
financial loss 
Table 53 - Qualitative measures of risk consequence or impact  
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Risk Assessment  
Risk Assessment 
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R
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C
on
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d 
ri
sk
 
ra
tin
g 
1 
Exposing 
operators to 
high alarm 
rates  
 Human stress 3 1 L 
Testing will be completed 
in a simulation testing 
environment as part of an 
operators training. 
Operators will be advised 
of the scenario testing. 
 
Testing will cover 
performance metrics from 
EEMUA 191 and ISA 
18.2.  
 
3 1 L 
2 
Errors in 
alarm 
analysis and 
conclusions 
 Product 
Liability  
 
 Professional 
Liability 
3 
 
1 
1 
 
2 
L 
 
L 
Analysis and 
interpretation of  results 
are part of a research 
dissertation and therefore 
require careful scrutiny 
through a thorough alarm 
rationalisation process to 
ensure any changes are 
peer and multidiscipline 
reviewed under a 
management of change 
process  
 
1 1 L 
3 
Companies 
associated to 
research 
project  
 Reputation 
 
 Security 
1 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
L 
 
L 
All reference to company 
data and information shall 
be deleted, referenced 
where applicable and or 
identity kept private. The 
information and data 
where company data is 
used is only for research / 
analysis for this project 
and not a company 
commissioned project for 
public scrutiny. 
 
1 1 L 
4 
Software and 
other 
products 
implicated 
 Reputation 3 1 L 
The intended the 
dissertation is not to 
review software produces 
and other analysis tools 
but mealy utilise there 
1 1 L 
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function to aid the 
example of how to best 
implement “Best practice 
management of industrial 
process control alarm 
floods” 
 
5 
Failure to 
achieve 
desired 
analysis 
results due to 
limitations or 
access to 
resources or 
tools 
 Stress 
 Financial 3 2 M 
Allow plenty of time 
through effective use of 
the GANTT chart noting 
milestones. Converse with 
supervisor. Identify other 
tools available e.g. MS 
excel, Matlab, Mathcad to 
assist in analysing data. 
Reach out to other 
colleagues. 
 
3 1 L 
6          
7          
Table 55 – Risk Assessment  
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APPENDIX F – Operator Questionnaire Example  
 
 
Figure 59: Operator Questionnaire ((EEMUA 191, 2013,  Appendix 9 pg 181) 
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Figure 60: Operator Questionnaire ((EEMUA 191, 2013, Appendix 9 pg 182) 
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Figure 61: Operator Questionnaire ((EEMUA 191, 2013, Appendix 9 pg 183) 
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APPENDIX G – Consequences 
 
The consequences resulting from data analysis results will have pros and cons –  
 
Pros – Implementing methods to better analyse alarm data improves plant reliability 
and collaborates success by minimising company and public exposure to poor 
performing control systems and production overheads. By investing in KPI's and 
analysis methodologies, companies and industry are better positioned to assess, 
identify, manage or predict events and provide statistical direction of poorly performing 
alarm systems considered invaluable information during alarm rationalisation 
workshops. The better information provided to a rationalisation workshop enhances the 
outcome by reducing time, cost in resources committed to rationalisation workshops 
and is often a rare event. However, by not analysing data, searching for and 
implementing improvements leaves the alarms system vulnerable to alarm floods, poor 
performance and potentially a major event. Finally the most important point of effective 
alarm analysis is to protect personnel, the environment, public and plant. 
 
Cons – Analysing any random data is susceptible to error or misleading information 
based on results obtained. Often a high probability of coincidence in alarm 
annunciation at or around similar events could be perceived as a possible relationship 
between alarm tags. The consequence of such could lead to an alarm being suppressed 
unnecessarily. Therefore relationships require in depth scrutiny by the engineering 
team. This scrutiny requires time and can be costly. However, must be considered 
before deciding to suppress the alarms around an identified alarm event or flood. Where 
careful scrutiny does not identify and remove the relationship of alarm tags to a random 
coincidence, the secondary alarms could be suppressed to an event journal and not the 
operator’s attention.  
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APPENDIX H – Project Ethics 
 
Engineering students working towards becoming a professional engineer are expected by the 
University of Southern Queensland (USQ) to align with the Engineers of Australia code of 
ethics. As an engineering student all work contained in this report or conduct throughout this 
project follows EA code of ethics and conduct.  
 
The EA code of ethics enables EA pathways for disciplinary processes against members and 
students who breach the code.  Chartered members and registrants on the various registers 
administered by the national engineering registration board are specifically required to practice 
in accordance with the code of ethics. Furthermore, EA code of ethics provides engineers and 
students with the core values that must be adhere to ensuring ethical decisions are made 
strengthening the profession and reputation of EA.  All members are required to practice and 
demonstrate integrity, practice competently, exercise leadership and promote sustainability. For 
more information on EA code of ethics please visit the webpage and or document referenced. 
 
